The
following article is based on a presentation made during the Second International
Conference on Integral Psychology, held at Pondicherry (India), 4-7 January
2001. The text has been published in:
Cornelissen, Matthijs (Ed.) (2001) Consciousness and Its Transformation,
Pondicherry: SAICE
Integral phenomenology
A method for the “new psychology”, the study of mysticism and the sacred
Dennis Hargiss
There has been much
talk recently concerning “the new psychology.” I feel it necessary to
state from the outset that this is not the topic
of my paper, for that would be rather like “putting the cart before the
horse”. Instead, this paper addresses the issue of how the new psychology
is to arise and presents a method or academic discipline through which
such a development may come about. I say “may come about,” for that depends
upon one’s sadhana (spiritual discipline).
For those sadhaks among
us whose calling for the present moment is to breathe, dwell in, and strengthen
one’s self in the subtle, thought-free atmosphere of the illimitable,
what I have to say in this paper may seem secondary, perhaps elementary—even
unnecessary. But for those among us who are presently called to help build
the intermediate bridge between the intellectual formulations of thinking
humanity and the truth vision of the gnostic seer, what follows may be
of import, whether one’s work arises from the illuminating insight of
spiritual realisation or the ardent, burning flame of psychic aspiration.
When I initially envisioned
this paper I intended to present in terms of religious psychology a model
of spiritual formation for the contemporary world—a graded architectonic
of the psyche, cross-cultural in scope, that would illustrate what Sri
Aurobindo refers to as “the natural curve of spiritual experience”. I
was then to present Sri Aurobindo and the medieval, mystic-theologian
Meister Eckhart as case studies, as I have done elsewhere, for example,
with the yoga sutras of Patanjali, the teaching of the Buddha as found
in the Pali canon, the mystical writings of the Jewish philosopher Philo
of Alexandria, and the haiku of the Japanese nature-mystic poet Matsuo
Basho. I soon realized, however, that such a work presupposes a certain
methodology and hermeneutic without which much of the assertions put forth
could appear questionable or even untenable according to the rigors of
academic inquiry. Consequently, I decided a short paper on methodology
more appropriate for this conference, and although the following ideas
were not derived from the discipline of psychology but rather through
my studies in the history of religion, my hope is that they may help ensure
that the house of the New Psychology will be built upon the sure foundation
of sound method and process—a foundation that I term “Integral Phenomenology.”
So how does all this
relate to Integral Psychology? Integral Psychology is based upon the first-hand
discovery, observation and eventual mastery of the various phenomena at
play within the subtle dimensions of the human psyche, as illumined by
the yoga of Sri Aurobindo. According to the discipline of Integral Phenomenology,
this comes about through actually “re-experiencing” through “mystical
lived-experience” the fundamental realizations that form the experiential
foundation of integral yoga. A corresponding spiritual state of consciousness
is formed within the scholar/sadhak, and this becomes the basis for the
expression of yogic insight in terms appropriate for the contemporary
world.
Though this notion of
the awakening or creation within oneself of the consciousness from which
integral yoga derived may not have been expressed in the terms of phenomenology,
it has been operative since the earliest days of the ashram. For instance,
among Sri Aurobindo’s earliest disciples Nolini Kanta Gupta once said:
“Indeed if you want to know truly something you have to become it. Becoming
gives the real knowledge. But becoming Sri Aurobindo and the Mother means
what? Becoming a portion of them, a part and parcel of their consciousness...”1
He continues:
“He [Sri Aurobindo] used
to put me in contact with his life, ... what he was, what he represented
in his consciousness. That was the central theme, because a truly great
poet means a status of consciousness; in order to understand his consciousness,
you must become identified with his being.”2
Nolini wasn’t the
only one with this understanding. Amrita expressed similar notions, and
the Mother also stressed that to the quiet and receptive mind the sharing
or identification with the being and consciousness of Sri Aurobindo may
take place through the reading of his work, especially Savitri.3
Sri Aurobindo once wrote
that Savitri was written “as a field
of experimentation to see how far poetry could be written from one’s own
yogic consciousness and how that could be creative.”4 The power
of such creative poetry lies especially in its ability to evoke, create,
and foster a corresponding yogic consciousness in the contemplative mind
of the reader.
In his comments on Savitri, Sri Aurobindo writes:
“The tale of Satyavan
and Savitri is recited in the Mahabharata as a story of conjugal love
conquering death. Satyavan is the soul carrying the divine truth of being
within itself but descended into the grip of death and ignorance; Savitri
is the Divine word, daughter of the sun, goddess of the supreme truth
who comes down and is to save.” He continues: “Still this is not a mere
allegory, the characters are not personified qualities, but incarnations
or emanations of living and conscious Forces with whom we can enter into
concrete touch and they take human bodies in order to help man and show
him the way from his mortal state to a divine consciousness and immortal
life.”2
And in all the thousands
of pages in a plethora of academic tomes addressing issues of methodology
and hermeneutics, there is not a clearer and more succinct description
of Integral Phenomenology than that found in a couple of short lines in
Sri Aurobindo’s Savitri itself (p. 525):
“For every symbol was
a reality
And brought the presence
which had given it life.”
The approach of integral
phenomenology has arisen in response to two observations I have made in
the comparative study of mysticism. First is the tendency of scholars
to think in terms of dualities and to thereby create unnecessary polemics
and stalemates in their work and discussions. (Such as we find in the
on-going debate between constructivism and essentialism.) A second observation—stemming
from such dualisms—concerns the epistemological problematic of the traditional
“objective” stance required of the scholar in the study of religion. This
perspective has been challenged in recent years by postmodern views questioning
the very possibility of objectivity, and emphasizing the imperative of
critical self-appraisal and identification of the perspectives which shape
(and circumscribe) the very mental lens through which we pursue our studies.
As Shelly once said in a poetic echo of Immanuel Kant, “The eye sees what
it brings to the seeing.”
This problem is particularly
acute in the study of mysticism due to the claim among certain mystics
that the nature of mystical experience can only be understood through
first-hand encounter. If, as William James once said, mystical states
represent points of view superior to
normal rational consciousness, and if “objectivity” is not even possible,
then is the mystic or adept from within a tradition privileged, or better
able to understand and explicate his area of study? Or stated differently:
In the attempt to understand the different types of samadhi as mentioned in Patanjali’s Yoga-Sutras (or the various rarified mind states delineated in
Buddhist psychology), would one’s objectives be best accomplished through
a religious scholar or a realized yogi (or meditation master)?
Underneath this question
lies a deeper inquiry addressing the very nature of the academic study
of religion. While many religious scholars are presently involved in a
debate concerning the noetic dimension of mystical experience, perhaps
a more relevant inquiry for our purposes concerns the noetic dimension
of religious scholarship itself. What exactly is knowledge—religious or
spiritual knowledge, or knowledge of mystical matters (as distinct from
mere information and theories)—and how is it related to our work as scholars
of religion and psychology?
This paper relates to
such questions, and consequently speaks to the larger issues concerning
the future of the study of religion and the “New Psychology”. However,
due to brevity it hopes at best to hint at a method of scholarship that
avoids the polarities among extremists and integrates the perspectives
of both scholars and mystics in a new model of “spiritual scholarship”
for the coming years.
Let me first contextualize
our study. Scholars in the comparative study of mysticism5
usually fall within one of two distinct schools.6 Those who
maintain that all mystical phenomena are necessarily grounded within the
particularities of the socio-religious frameworks within which such phenomena
arose are called “constructivists” or “empirical theorists of mysticism.”7
They stress the irreducibility and uniqueness of a particular religious
idea, experience or doctrine, and usually restrict their work to the study
of a certain personage or an aspect of a single religious tradition. Those
in the second school bear the appellation of “essentialist theorists of
mysticism,”8 and accentuate the commonality—even “essential
unity”—of mystical phenomena which have been observed through crosscultural
study and inter-religious dialogue.
Considerable debate
has taken place between these two schools, and disagreement continues
concerning which of the two approaches reveals the “true” nature of mysticism.9
Yet from within the discipline of the phenomenology of religion may be
found an alternate approach which integrates the values of both schools.
It should be noted,
however, that many phenomenologists are likewise split between two similar
schools: a) “concrete” or descriptive phenomenology
of religion (which regards religious phenomena as unique, and consequently
restricts its work to the formation of an inventory of phenomena that
accentuates the historicocultural contexts of certain religious ideas
and the distinct meanings that they have for believers and practitioners);
and b) “essential phenomenology” (the branch that engages in crosscultural
comparisons of religious phenomena in the attempt to discern shared types
or common features of human religiosity). In this paper I propose an alternate
approach10 that regards these schools as two complementary
levels of phenomenological description. This third approach integrates
the perspectives of both schools into a comprehensive view including both
“surfacelevel” description of religious phenomena which believers regard
as important, distinct and/or peculiar to their religion, as well as structural
description of common features shared across various religious traditions.11
Perhaps the most well-known
and influential scholar to employ the notion of structures as an heuristic
device in discovering shared features throughout the world’s religions
was Mircea Eliade. According to Eliade, the perceptive scholar may discern
“patterns” in diverse religious phenomena, and the recognition of these
patterns or “structures” facilitates our understanding of their meaning.12 While this “search for formal structures
with universal values”13 has recently fallen into disrepute
among certain postmodern critical theorists (e.g., Foucault, Derrida),
the endeavour has found support among others (such as Habermas and Halbfass)
who lean away from the totalizing pretensions of deconstructionism and
argue rather that deconstructionists’ concerns may be integrated with
meaningful dialogue and intercultural rapprochement into a pragmatic approach
to communication and understanding across the traditions.14
This present study joins
this on-going discussion concerning the efficacy of postulating “patterns”
or “structures” as examples of the “pragmatics of communication”15
in the study of religion.
Before going further
in our discussion I should clarify what is meant by the term “structure”
in the discipline of integral phenomenology. Despite resonance with the
term as found in structural linguistics (where the structure of language—determined
by morphological, phonological, syntactic, and semantic rules—is a necessary
and sufficient condition for linguistic meaning),16 our interests
in hermeneutical issues draws more upon the later Husserl (e.g., Ideas [1969]) and his idea of transcendental phenomenology.
(“Transcendental” here is used in a Kantian sense to refer to the view
that our experience and knowledge of the world is dependent on the structure
and activity of our mind.) In Husserl’s attempt to establish a basis for
a “critical philosophy,” he situated phenomenological method within the
transcendental sphere of “pure logic,” and his notion of “structure” corresponded
to this sphere in contradistinction to the empirical world available to
our senses (this parallels his distinction between “formal” and “material”
ontology). The task of the phenomenologist was to develop the faculty
of “eidetic vision” or “intuition” (Wesensschau/Wesensschauung)
whereby the Eidos (idea) or essence of phenomena could be apprehended.
For Husserl, such “intuiting of essence” equates with the “seeing of structure,”
and constitutes the necessary condition in phenomeno–logical analysis
whereby the “meaning” of phenomena becomes logically self-evident.17
Also contributing to
the notions of “structure” and “meaning” in phenomenological studies were
Dilthey’s concepts of Erlebnis (“intentional experience”),
Verstehen (“emphathetic
understanding”), and Nachleben (“re-experiencing”
or “reliving”). Mac Linscott Ricketts states: “For Dilthey, Erlebnis was the peculiar human faculty by which man, as distinct
from animals, perceives the universe. It is the posture of the artist
before the universe which enables him to feel a oneness with its essence.
In order for the historian to grasp the inner meaning and purpose of history,
Dilthey said that a preliminary act of sympathy or Erlebnis was necessary. The inner states of the human subject
being studied by the historian must first be relived or re-experienced
before history can be written” (Ricketts [1988], 105). In Dilthey’s view,
“we understand an expression by re-experiencing (nach-erleben) in our consciousness the experience from which the
expression arose.”18
Eliade’s teacher Nae
Ionescu was also influenced by the notion of a structural level of phenomenological
description. However, Ionescu went beyond the intentions of Husserl and
Dilthey and developed a metaphysic that imbues the “hidden meaning” of
phenomena with an unique ontological status. According to Ionescu, the
“structural level” of phenomena is composed of two different types of structures. In the realm of logic and ratiocination
there are various conceptual categories (st 1), and in ontological reality
there exists a realm of “essences.” Such essences corresponding to the
second type of “structures” (st 2), are not merely functions of our minds
but rather metaphysical realities which manifest through concrete phenomena.
Though these structures parallel their conceptual correspondents in the
mental realm, they exist independently and are not to be confused with
nor reduced to structures in the “realm of logic” (st 1). Along the vein
of van der Leeuw who believed that the structural level of phenomena is
to be discovered by the hermeneut through first discerning their non-linguistic
meaning,19 Ionescu taught that the metaphysical reality of
the ontological structure of essences (st 2) must be discovered by an
intuitive insight into reality, or what he called traire, “mystical lived-experience.”20
To the scholar willing
to learn the discipline, this way of mystical intuition represented the
hermeneutical method par excellence,
for just as the recognition of patterns (st 1) helps the scholar discern
the meaning of various religious phenomena, so the intuitive experience
of structural essences (st 2) facilitates the understanding, expression,
and explanation of metaphysical realities through conceptual formulations
(i.e., in the form of “knowledge”).
Eliade combined these
notions with a more Jungian understanding of structure and envisioned
a discipline called “metapsycho–analysis” for the phenomenologist of religion.
According to Eliade, “The symbol is not a mere reflection of objective
reality. It reveals something more profound and basic. Therefore, religious
symbols are capable of revealing a modality of the real or a structure of the world
that is not evident on the level of immediate experience.”21
Here symbols are seen as the conceptual representations of essences within
the organizing structure of categories (st 1), and mediate metaphysical
realities to the receptive mind of the scholar—the actual realities behind
the phenomena the scholar attempts to understand (st 2). Consequently,
the apprehension of the symbol is not merely an academic, intellectual
endeavor, but rather “the cause of the creation in [the scholar] of a
spiritual state analogous with the object it represents (Ionescu).”22
Eliade states: “For this [metapsychoanalysis] would lead to an awakening,
and a renewal of consciousness, of the archaic symbols and archetypes
whether still living or fossilized in the religious traditions of mankind.”23
In other words, the study and apprehension of religious symbols provide
the scholar with a unique “spiritual path” and mental discipline which
opens a means of cognition that includes but is not limited to theorizing
and reasoning.
The study of mysticism
according to integral phenomenology accentuates and further develops this
notion of the intuitive apprehension of the “hidden meaning” behind religious
symbols and mystical phenomena. In this sense it acquires a wealth of
experience or first-hand encounter often assumed the exclusive privilege
of the religious practitioner. However, it doesn’t limit itself to subjective
experience but draws upon the dynamics of the hermeneutical circle in
the attempt to integrate such insight with the critical appraisal of the
scholar. One engages the world of mystical phenomena with a more informed
and open perspective (and therefore a less circumscribed capacity more
able to “intuit” the meaning of such phenomena), and every time one “returns”
to the rational realm of critical reflection one brings an enhanced ability
to understand and describe mystical phenomena in terms of conceptual categories.
It is precisely this integration and mutual reciprocity of intuitive insight
and critical reflection that is the hallmark of integral phenomenology.
This approach goes beyond
mere sympathy in a method akin to what Robert Neville speaks of as the
“tao-daimon discipline of the academic study of religion.”24
In his article entitled “The Emergence of the Historical Consciousness”
Neville draws upon and develops Clifford Geertz’s notion of “thick description”
(i.e., a method combining “knowing about” religious phenomena with a participant-observer’s
understanding of how people existentially relate to such phenomena). The
“tao-daimon” model acknowledges the importance of combining first-hand
encounter with one’s subject matter (the “Tao”) with the critical reflection
of the scholar (Socrates’ “Daimon”). Neville’s idea that “the study of
religion has indeed given rise to a dimension of spirituality that stands
alongside and supplements those of the world’s great religions”25
resonates well with the views explicated in this paper. However, while
Neville’s entry into “the Tao” was through “religious participation,”
the approach of integral phenomenology represents a unique path in and
of itself—a path of “academic participation” or “spiritual scholarship.”
Notes and References
1 Collected Works
of Nolini Kanta Gupta (Nolini
Kanta Gupta Birth Centenary, All India Press, Pondicherry, 1989), Vol.5,
p. 35.
2 Ibid.,
p. 38.
3 These notions
continue a rich discipline of scriptural exegesis (mamamsa) in the Indian traditions. Compare, for example,
the following statement of Smirat Anirvan from an article entitled Vedic Exegesis: “Interpretation always presupposes a spiritual communion between the interpreter and the subject he seeks
to interpret. This becomes imperative when one seeks to interpret a culture,
a way of thought, or a thing of the Spirit. A process of saturation, resulting
in a participation
mystique, must set in before
the eyes are ready to see and the mind to grasp.” (Italics added for emphasis.
From S. Radhakrishnan et. Al., eds., The Cultural Heritage of India, Vol. 1, p. 326.) Compare also to the notions of
manana and nididhyasana
as described by Dr. Thomas Kochumattam in his article “Sanskrit Terminology
and Christian Theology” in Unique and Universal (Bangalore: Dharmanam Pub., 1972), p. 62.
4 A.B. Purani,
Life of Sri Aurobindo (Sri
Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, 1978), p. 236.
5 The importance
of the study of mysticism was noted several decades ago in William James’
landmark study The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature
(New York: Modern Library, 1929). In this work, James refers to our ordinary
consciousness as but one special type of consciousness among many others,
and he points to the possibility of mystical states as representing “superior
points of view, windows through which the mind looks out upon a more extensive
and inclusive world” (296; 418-19). More recently, in Exploring Mysticism: A Methodological
Essay (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1975), Fritz Staal states that “no theory of the
mind which cannot account for mystical experiences can be adequate” (198).
For a brief study summarizing the academic study of mysticism over the
past two centuries see Bernard McGinn, The Foundations of Mysticism (New York: Crossroad, 1991), Appendix.
6 For the following observations I am indebted to the work of Denise Carmody
and John T. Carmody, Mysticism: Holiness East and West (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1996), chapter 1; see also Michael
Stoeber, Theo-Monistic Mysticism: A Hindu-Christian Comparison (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 7-38.
7 According
to Stephen Katz, mystical experiences “are inescapably shaped by prior
linguistic influences such that the lived experience conforms to a pre-existent
pattern that has been learned, then intended, and then actualized in the
experiential reality of the mystic.” From S.T. Katz, “Mystical Speech
and Mystical Meaning,” in Stephen T. Katz (ed.), Mysticism and Mystical Language (New York: Oxford UP, 1992), 5. The full theoretical
formulation of this contextual approach to the study of mysticism has
been presented in “Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism” and “The “Conservative”
Character of Mystical Experience” in Steven T. Katz (ed.), Mysticism and Religious
Traditions (New York: Oxford
UP, 1983), 3-60. For a recent, provocative exposition of the constructivist
epistomological framework within the context of the synthesis of religions,
see John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion (London: Macmillan Press, 1989).
8 For examples
of this approach to the study of religion and religious experience see
W.T. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy (London:
Macmillan, 1961); Huston Smith, Forgotten Truth: The Primordial Tradition (New York: Harper & Row, 1976); M. Darrol Bryant
(ed.), Essays on World Religions (New York: Paragon House, 1992); Alduous Huxley,
The Perennial Philosophy
(New York: Harper, 1945); Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism (New
York: New American Library, 1974); and Caroline Franks Davis, The Evidential Force
of Religious Experience (Oxford:
Oxford UP, 1990). For a good secondary treatment of the primordial tradition
(which is often associated with essentialist views) from the perspective
of a contemporary process theologian see David Ray Griffin, Primordial Truth and
Postmodern Theology (Albany,
NY.: SUNY Press, 1989).
9 See, for
example, Peter Moore, “Mystical Experience, Mystical Doctrine, and Mystical
Technique,” in Steven Katz (ed.), Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis (London: Sheldon Press, 1978), and Robert Gimello,
“Mysticism and Its Contexts,” in Katz (1983). For critiques of the approaches
and “neo-Kantian” epistemology exemplified by the authors in the Katz
volumes, see Robert K.C. Forman (ed.), The Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), and idem. Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999). See also Deirdre Green,
“Unity in Diversity,” Scottish Journal of Religious Studies, vol. 3, 1 (Spring 1982), 53-60; and Donald Evans, “Can Philosophers Limit
What Mystics Can Do? A Critique of Steven Katz,” in Bruce S. Alton (ed.),
Religions
and Languages: A Colloquim
(Toronto Studies in Religion; vol 13), (New York: Peter Lang, 1991), 125-34.
10 For related
methodological studies on this matter see Eliade’s article “Methodological
Remarks in the Study of Religious Symbolism,” in The History of Religions:
Essays in Methodology (eds.),
Mircea Eliade and Joseph Kitagawa (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
1959); Mircea Eliade, The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1969); and Antonio Barbosa
da Silva, The Phenomenolgy of Religion as a Philosophical Problem (Sweden: CWG Gleerup, 1982).
11 For examples
of this type of phenomenological work, see Mircea Eliade, Patterns in Comparative
Religion, translated by Rosemary
Sheed (London: Sheed & Ward, 1958), and idem. (Ed.), A History of Religious Ideas 3 vols. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982).
12 “In the
history of religions, as in other mental disciplines, it is knowledge
of structure which makes it possible to understand meanings.” See Mircea Eliade, Myths, Dreams and
Mysteries (New York: Harper
and Row, 1967), 191. See also Eliade (1969). For a study of Eliade’s use
of “structure” and related terms see Antonio Barbosa da Silva (1982),
210 f.
13 The quote
is from Michel Foucault and is taken from Thomas McCarthy, Ideas and Illusions:
On Reconstruction and Deconstruction in Contemporary Critical Theorists
(Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press,
1991), 6.
14 See McCarthy,
Ibid. For a related study of postmodernity and East/West dialogue see
J.J. Clarke, Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter Between Asian and Western Thought (London: Routledge, 1997), 95 f., 181-225. For a
study concerning Eliade and postmodernity see Bryan S. Rennie, Reconstructing Eliade:
Making Sense of Religion
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 232-41.
15 The phrase
is from Jurgen Habermas. See McCarthy, Ibid.
16 For the application
of this approach to the study of religion, see Ninian Smart, The Phenomenon of
Religion (London and Oxford:
Mowbrays, 1978), esp. 45 ff.
17 Such notions
greatly contributed to the philosophical background for Eliade’s phenomenological
method. See Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations (The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), especially 22,
62, 69-75; also idem., Ideas (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1969), esp.
379, 395 f.
18 The quote
from Hodges is taken from the International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (1960), Vol 4:185.
19 “Meaning”
here for van der Leeuw follows along the trajectory of Heidegger (i.e.,
as purpose, significance,
value, importance and
end), which (for Heidegger) corresponds to the realm
of transcendental-ontological “categories,” as opposed to actual ontical
phenomena (a distinction that parallels that of “existential / existentiell”
in Heidegger’s discussions of Dasein [man],
and corresponds to Kant’s “–transcendental / empirical” distinction.)
See Gunnar Skirbekk, Truth and Preconditions (Stensilserie No 4, Universitetet I Bergen, Filosofiskt Institutt, 1970),
17-21; see also da Silva, 95, 58-60.
20 This phrase,
taken from Ionescu’s Metafizica,
67-69, 71-72, 77-81, is a translation of trâire (which refers to life, living, enduring, feeling, experience, etc.) and approximates the German Erlebnis. In fact, the literary critic G. Câlinescu (Istoria literaturii
române, p. 866) believed
that Ionescu derived his idea of trâire from
Dilthey. Though there are distinct differences between the two thinkers
(especially concerning their views of metaphysics and transcendence in
general), Ionescu’s notion of “lived experience” has deep resonances with
Dilthey’s concepts of Erlebnis (“intentional
experience”), Verstehen (“emphathetic
understanding”), and Nachleben (“re-experiencing”
or “reliving”). As mentioned before, M.L. Ricketts states: “ In order
for the historian to grasp the inner meaning and purpose of history, Dilthey
said that a preliminary act of sympathy or Erlebnis was necessary. The inner states of the human subject
being studied by the historian must first be relived or re-experienced
before history can be written” (Ricketts [1988], 105). Compare this view
of Dilthey with the following by Ionescu: “My whole effort at understanding
and interpreting political events is based on a precise method …. This
method proceeds with the identification of structure and it appeals, therefore,
primarily to intuition, to the ability to see …. This is not so easy.
It demands a certain maturity in observation, a certain amount of experience
…. Once you’ve mastered the method, however, you see all.” (From Ionescu’s
Roza vânturilor [April, 1932], 300-01, as quoted by Ricketts [1988],
105-06.) Also, see Ionescu’s comments below concerning the apprehension
of symbols.
21 (Italics
added for emphasis.) See M.Eliade and J. Kitagawa, The History of Religions:
Essays in Methodology (Chicago:
Chicago University press, 1959), 98, 101.
22 Ionescu,
Metafizica, 134.
23 Eliade, The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion (Chicago: Chicago U P, 1969), 35.
24 See Robert
Neville’s comments concerning the “secular spiritual disciplines of scholarship”
in his article entitled “The Emergence of the Historical Consciousness”
in Peter H. Van Ness (ed.), Spirituality and the Secular Quest (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1996), 129-56;
see esp. 130.
25 Ibid., p.
136.