The
following article is based on a presentation made during the Second International
Conference on Integral Psychology, held at Pondicherry (India), 4-7 January
2001. The text has been published in:
Cornelissen, Matthijs (Ed.) (2001) Consciousness and Its Transformation,
Pondicherry: SAICE
Beside the “intentor” and
the “integrator”
Looking at two “faces” of consciousness
Sangeetha Menon
I. Introduction
Be it of the physical,
mental or social world, understanding is always of something which is
other than us, to which we are not acquainted. We intend to know the other. We understand the other by means
of images, ideas, words and metaphors. All of these tools are involved
in the building of institutions and organized knowledge systems. In the
process of understanding we also try to integrate the
knowledge we get into the larger system of our world-view, which in turn
influences, consciously and unconsciously, our ways of responding to situations.
In the study of mind
and consciousness the basic duality involved in understanding takes the
interesting turn of integrating the understanding of the experiencer with
experience itself. The experiencer itself becomes a factor in the process
of intending to understand the experience.
If “definition” and
“knowledge” are to be objective, with the potential for “predictability”
and “repeatability”, can we include the study of human mind and consciousness
under classical ways of understanding? Can we define consciousness based
on pre-experiential understanding of it? Can the experience be studied
with the experiencer having minimal or no role? Conversely, can the self/experiencer
be understood with experience having minimal or no role? In short will
the definition of consciousness be exhaustive of its complexity?
I propose that these
questions are as difficult or easy as asking “can I see my face”. I can
see my face as much as it is represented. But none of the representations
can replace my original face. What we “see” is only the reported. The
being of the reported cannot be confused with the being of the original.
Whether they are two distinct duals is of course a metaphysical theme
for discussion. However, I think, the most interesting issue is that though
“the reported” and “that which is reported about” could not be reduced
to one, “the reported” and “that which is reported about” can influence
each other. I understand and define my self based on my experiences. At
the same time, my experience depends upon the notion that I have of my
self.
I intend to know.
I also integrate that
which I know.
And this mysterious
power of consciousness to both intend as well as integrate is the puzzle
that we are all trying to solve!
2.Methods and approaches
2.1: “Name-ing” and “Form-ing” the Unknown
A common feature of
many of the approaches to the study of “consciousness” is the distinctness
in the method of defining the problem. The study of “consciousness” is
initiated by two parameters such as the “name” and “form” of consciousness.
In other words “the what” and “the where” of consciousness (Menon, 1999)
mark the starting point to address the complex issues involved of the
unknown. The definition for “consciousness” would restrict the specific
areas for investigation and also categorise them on the basis of related
functions whether cognitive, physiological or even trans-mental. The classification
of different approaches to consciousness studies could be based on this
point itself. And, without this classification, there is not only the
possibility of the absence of conceptual exchange between methods but
also semantic confusion. This would also mean that “the perspective” is
as important as the problem itself for interdisciplinary discussions on
a complex phenomenon like consciousness. If the perspective itself is
clearly laid down by means of the categories and concepts used, the “mystery”
and “anonymity” generated during the discussions about “consciousness”
could be avoided to a larger extent.
A major clash between
discussions being how the subjective and/or objective (functional) nature
of consciousness is accounted, an initial clarity and specificity in terms
of the conceptual framework and extent of the applications of the method
would be helpful as well as foundational in constructing theories and
developing interdisciplinary exchanges.
2.2: Localisation of
Conscious Experiences
To elaborate further
on this contention, a wide spread “attitude” towards consciousness namely
the “given-ness of the problem of consciousness” could be looked into.
A taken for granted assumption that “consciousness” is something static
and sedentary “sitting” somewhere to be understood
has led to a major part of the research towards the localization of conscious
experiences. Though the “unknowability” of “consciousness” as a complex
phenomenon is conceded, it (the “unknown’) has also encouraged the classical
way of knowing which is by means of segregation and performance. Distinct
performances of “consciousness” are taken and these are labelled as “conscious
experiences” and their origin, function and localized area (neurophysical
and neurochemical) identified as the problems to be solved. The understanding
of “consciousness” is essentially the understanding of neuronal functions,
cognitive or sensory-motor. The major trend beholden by this trend is
the “building block approach” (Searle, 2000) which explains the conscious
field as consisting of a series of building blocks each being a conscious
experience. The knowledge about any one conscious experience would contribute
to the understanding of other kinds of conscious experiences. The mystery
of consciousness would finally be solved by the understanding of the interconnections
between the causal mechanisms of different conscious experiences. Questions
about continuity, uniqueness and nonphysical attributes of consciousness,
by this approach become auxiliary or even redundant.
The building of consciousness
from fewer characteristics to a larger number of characteristics is certainly
an approach that would favour the Darwinian evolutionary advantage. This
approach would also be able to forsake the need for a specific working
definition of consciousness. Eventually the method (instrument, design,
measurement etc.) for investigation becomes the crux of the study. The
means to understand becomes the subject for analysis and focus. But “what”
is to be understood, in the process, is either not defined, or ontologically
reduced and pushed into an epistemological oblivion.
3. Is consciousness
unknown like any other unknown?
3.1: A neighbour unnoticed and the “puzzle of consciousness”
Obviously it is the
“why” of “consciousness” that has made it so interesting for us to know
more about it. Why should discrete neuronal functions and neurochemical
reactions “generate” a unified feeling of having physical sensations such
as pain, or even mental dispositions such as sorrow, happiness etc.? Why
should quantitative phenomenon have qualitative correlates? These two
questions form the basis of the “puzzle of consciousness” distinguished
as the “easy” and “hard” problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1995). The
“unknowablity” of consciousness, which is centred around the “hard” problem
of consciousness, is not just about the subjective and qualitative nature
of consciousness but also about the prior distinction between subject
and object that precedes any theory formation or metaphysical discussion.
The distinction between
the subject and object, that is, something which is near to me/part of
me and something which is far away from/other than me, is fundamental
to human thinking and experience (See Drg-Drsya Viveka of Adi Sankaracharya) whether physical, mental or socio-cultural. The mystery
about consciousness is the mystery about the gap between two distinct
“entities” namely the objective and the subjective. Can one be reduced
to the other; or can the existence of one be caused by the other: explaining
one in terms of the other seems to be also the way to solve the “disturbing”
duality.
3.2: The changing and
the abiding
The discussion on
the “hard problem” of consciousness has generated a consensus on identifying
the “puzzle of consciousness” as involving a qualitative duality. Whether
this duality is apparent or real is the intractable question eluding neurobiologists
and philosophers. If the ontological nature is taken as the defining and
demarcating factor, the duality involved in consciousness could be seen
as ontological too. The neurophysiological function and the sensory-motor
response caused/triggered by an external stimulus are two distinct reals
from a physical point of view of the brain/consciousness. From a personalistic/non-physical
point of view the picture is different. It is me having an experience of pain; whether I am cognizant of the neuronal functions
or not is not a deciding factor on which my experience is dependent. I may or may not be having the knowledge
about the neuronal functions responsible for my specific conscious experiences.
But for sure, I have the knowledge of/am aware of distinct conscious experiences
relating to and abiding in me. The neuronal reactions and the sensory-motor
responses are also not the significant signs of “my conscious experience”
but it is the unified “identity feeling” of “me having such an experience”
which is the significant sign of my conscious experience. Even if we look
at the duality involved from this perspective it is that which is initiated
by the identity of “me” (I am having an experience) and “mine” (my experience).
The duality problem
of consciousness is of two kinds: one is of the “easy”
and “hard” problem; and the other is within the hard problem. The duality
within the “hard problem” is a phenomeno–logical puzzle and raises a “harder
problem” (Menon, 2001). The
duality of the “easy” and “hard” problem is a neurobiological problem.
There are three distinct
“features” known of “consciousness”. At every instance of physical pain
(physical-conscious experience), mental pain (non-physical-conscious experience)
or any other (conscious) experience there is a “gestalt” of meaning brought
out by a union of three units such as
i) experience (e.g.: pain)
ii) experiencer (e.g.: me in pain)
iii) I-ness (me having pain)
The first two: “experience
of pain” and “me in pain” are ontologically of a transient nature. Just
as the “experience of pain” I can have many other distinct experiences.
Correspondingly the “experiencer” also changes.
The third unit that
is of a meta-experiential nature (“me having such
an experience”) is changeless, since it accrues to a continuing and abiding
“I-ness”. It is this unit that integrates both the distinct conscious
experiences and the conscious experiencer and presents a meaningful continuity.
3.3: The other-ness
and near-ness of the unknown
Experiences are mostly
characterized by their “distance” and broadly divided as objective and
subjective. We can have a range of experiences, a certain type pertaining
to outside objects, and a certain type pertaining to inside objects. When
my toe hits a stone, the pain I feel is “inside”, but the stone, which
has triggered the pain, is an object outside, which has its own distinct
physical properties. The experience of pain is nearer to me than the experience
of the existence of the stone. “Is the perception of the stone nearer
to me and belongs to the same class of the pain” is another question to
be looked into. At this juncture of our discussion, what is attempted
is to see the broader classification of that which is outside the subject
and that which is inside the subject.
Whether it is the existence
of the stone, or the pain, both are given meaning, by relating them to
a personal identity:
i) [I see that] the stone exists
ii) I feel pain
The feeling of pain
is nearer [to me] than the existence of the stone. At the same time the
pain as well as the stone are recognized as other than me. There is something
unknown about both the pain as well as the stone. The stone as well as
the pain are also “felt” as other than me.
Is consciousness “unknown”
like the “other” unknowns? This question once again focuses on the “harder
problem” of consciousness. The stone (object which has physical properties)
or the pain (object which has mental properties) is experienced as other
than me, changing and having meaning when related to an experiencer. They
are unknown because they are other than me.
Consciousness is not
totally unknown, since it is possible to know about it through the distinct
experiences and also through the distinct experiencers. What is unknown
and mysterious about consciousness is threefold:
i) How is a meaningful continuity of me having different and distinct experiences
produced?
ii) Why is a meaningful
continuity of me having different and distinct experiences produced?
iii) Where is the
meaningful continuity of me having different and distinct experiences
produced?
The unknown-ness of
consciousness is about, the “harder problem” of consciousness, the distinct
and unique I-ness performing two functions different by their ontology:
There is an intentional “outward” movement of consciousness; There is
also an integral “inward” movement of consciousness.
4. Two faces of consciousness
4.1: What does consciousness “look like”?
Like causality, attributing
a name and limiting to a form are also ways of the human mind to know
the “unknown”. It is also interesting that our minds (and institutions
of knowledge creation) use history as a tool (may be because we essentially
deal with relative time: past, present and future) to understand and classify
new objects of knowledge, and therefore comparison is as important as
uniqueness. To know something new, we first compare it with classified
and validated knowledge (by accepted tests, measurements etc.) and then
allocate them under a category. Therefore the “new” is always relative
to the “old”. In other words, the “unknown” is relative to the “known”.
It is this basic structure of duality embedded in our thinking that helps
us to know, to relate and to have meaningful interactions and institutions.
In consciousness studies,
we look for measurable physical correlates of qualitative non-physical
conscious experiences. The contention is that discrete conscious experiences
could be localized and identified by their neural correlates. Whether
the neural correlates are also the neural causes of conscious experiences
is an issue debated within this camp. This method also helps to trace
the evolutionary path of consciousness starting from its primordial beginnings
(in terms of functions).
How much of a conscious
experience could be identified and localized by its neural correlate is
an important question. The discussion on this question would bring forth
the quantitative and qualitative distinctions vivid in a conscious experience.
Whether brains need to be the centre of focus for understanding consciousness,
might also emerge as a question to be looked into. At the same time, unless
we identify cortical areas and limit to neuronal functions, a matching
of cognitive abilities and degrees of consciousness cannot be possible.
To match brain functions and degrees of consciousness is a major step
towards understanding the complexity of not only human behaviour and intelligence
but also life as a whole. But then, how far can we reach by such a ladder
of linear and hierarchical steps? Will we be able to find all the missing
links? Will we be able to understand the qualitative jumps made and the
vast differences between kinds of consciousness (such as: waking, dream,
deep sleep; conscious, unconscious, subconscious; attitude, personality
traits, identity)?
4.2: Ways to Knowledge
and Ways to Transformation
There seem to be two
kinds of pursuits: The first kind is that which attempts to generate,
classify and categorize knowledge for building institutions and understanding
various levels of complexities in human behaviour. The second kind is
that which does not follow a structured database, but which attempts to
transform existing patterns of thinking and experience. The distinction
between ways to knowledge creation and ways to transformation is well
spelt out in the area of consciousness studies. Therefore, understanding
consciousness in terms of degrees of intelligence and thereby degrees
of self-awareness (based on cognitive and social functions) is as important
as practices and philosophies that focus on the transformation of states
of mind and experiences. Neural mechanisms and even their artificial simulations
to cause specific experiences are indeed significant to be understood.
Their understanding is considered significant since it leads to the removal
of myths created about the ethereal continuity of consciousness. Reducing
conscious experiences to their neural mechanisms, causes and cortical
areas, according to this camp, is tantamount to reducing something (self)
mistaken as qualitative to quantitative.
This reductionism is
good enough to have a focal understanding about consciousness and, based
on this, to have a better classification of intelligence ranging from
humans to other animals to machines. But is the problem fully grasped
and accounted for by that attempt? If we look a bit closer, the answer
is “No”. The problem about consciousness is not just about having different
kinds of conscious experiences and their explanation in terms of neural
causes and correlates. Had that been the case reductionism would have
solved the mystery underlying the phenomenon.
The problem of consciousness
is less about conscious experiences and more about the conscious experiencer.
Based on the brain, we might be able to map the history of life and evolution
of human intelligence. But, unfortunately, this mapping will not be sufficient
to understand the principal nature of consciousness namely self-orientation
(Menon, 1999). The
problem of self is not even the problem of degrees of self-awareness (which
is accounted by cognitive abilities and social intelligence) but is the
problem of self in and by itself. Ways to understand neural mechanisms
underlying conscious experiences and ways to transform states of mind
and experiences are distinct by method as well their ultimate goals. The
goal of the first being scientific knowledge about life and intelligence
and the second being spiritual inquiry. The distinction between these
methods and goals also brings forth two levels of complexity in consciousness,
of the “I” and of the “experience”.
4.3: The “who am I”
question
Since
it is not in accordance with the usual norms of scientific thinking, the
question relating to the nature of consciousness pertains to its phenomenological
functions (neural and cognitive) and physico-chemistry which can be specified
and quantified, and not to its ontology. The ontology of consciousness
necessarily involves qualitative factors and understanding, which would
then emphasize not the many-ness of conscious experiences but the uniqueness
of the conscious experiencer or what is easily available to us as our
“I-ness”. The “who am I” question (See Saddarsanam of Sri Ramana Maharishi) could
open new avenues to the understanding of consciousness, and herald a different
approach (from locating conscious experiences) to spiritual enquiry and
transforming states of mind.
4.4: The One Face and
Two Looks
If the question about
“I-ness” is significant to understand consciousness, then what is the
meaning of neurobiological and other locus-specific approaches to consciousness?
Are they opposed to self-approaches or even redundant? We can say that
the answer is negative. The two approaches, though distinct by their very
nature and method, are equally meaningful. We might even consider that
the complexity of consciousness would see some light of unravelling only
in the corridors where the two approaches would meet and be complementary
to each other.
The complexity of consciousness
is such that it is simple in the context of the experiencer, but intricate
when the experience is analysed. Therefore it is likely that the first
person approaches would contribute to the growth and transformation of
the human self and third person approaches to the generation and application
of knowledge about human intelligence and life as a whole. In both the
cases, we should remember that the complexity about consciousness lies
not in its nature but in understanding its two distinct and different
expressions of the “experiencer” and the “experience”. The “Face” is simple.
The two “Looks” are complex and difficult to understand.
4.5: Intention, Integration
and the Irreducible I-ness
It is difficult to
understand the two varied expressions of consciousness because they are
different in terms of their production, function and evolution. Much of
the discussion in the circles of philosophy and science is centred on
the intentional mode of consciousness (Varela, 1999) and its production
(or qualitative nature). For some reason it is forgotten that many a times
human lives are guided by the habitual (social and psychological) ways
of responding to situations and unintentional consequences of human actions
(See Brahmasutra Adhyasa
Bhashya of Adi Sankaracharya).
The intentional act and thinking and the non-intentional act and thinking:
both have meaning, when we look at the human mind, since they are co-coordinated,
structured (Menon, 2001) and given a continuity by their belonging to
an “I-ness”. This “I-ness” is irreducible.
Intentional
and non-intentional acts and thinking could as well come under the purview
of philosophical and neurobiological analysis. But the “irreducible “I-ness”
is transcendental to even a meta-level of understanding and is purely
experiential and self-oriented.
Our conscious experiences
could be the product of our intentional or non-intentional acts and thinking.
Analytical knowledge about them also is the product of the intentional
mode of consciousness. What is often missed in attempts to understand
consciousness is the categorization of the “irreducibility” of consciousness
in terms of “I-ness”. Reductionism could work only on the level of intentionality.
The irreducibility of “I-ness” could be appreciated better if we introduce
the “integral” mode of consciousness (See Bhagavad Gita Ch.13 Bhasya of Adi Sankaracharya). We not only (intend to) know and experience.
We also integrate that which is known and experienced to a larger self.
What is beside both the intending and the integrating is (your and my)
“I-ness”.
4.6: Self-exploration
and the unavoidable mystery about consciousness
The mystery about
consciousness is the mystery about its “belonging” to a self. This mystery
is unavoidable to the extent we try to understand the integral mode of
consciousness and the simple given-ness of your “I-ness” and mine. We
can understand consciousness as far as it is represented and reported.
It would be equal to saying that the story is complete at its introduction,
if we conclude that the problem of consciousness is answered by its representations.
Representations cannot replace the original. And therefore the reported
cannot be confused with the original. However intricate and interesting
the reported is, it would be unwise to think that the original has nothing
more to it than its representations.
Understanding consciousness
is continuous self-exploration. Knowledge about consciousness does not
work in a linear and causal fashion. Self-knowledge is transcendental.
Therefore understanding consciousness would come by exploring the many
possibilities of human self and mind, rather than by the convenient addressing
of it as a figment of imagination. What is interesting and worthy of exploration
is to look at what is beside both the intending and the integrating mode
of consciousness. Focusing on the duality (intentional and integral mode)
of consciousness might result in epistemological circularities until and
unless we look at what is “beside” both the modes, which is the “I-ness”.
To see the “wave” is to see the “sea”. To see the “sea” is to see the
“wave”. To see what is beside both is to become one with the non-dual.
5. Conclusion
What was attempted
in this discussion was to look whether the duality involved in the understanding
of consciousness is basic. Intentional and integral mode of consciousness
could be better explained and the epistemological circularity involved
in duality-approaches could be avoided if we include a third factor of
“I-ness” which is non-linear, alocal and acausal, and hence metaphorically
described as “beside” in this paper. The mystery about consciousness is
that it is self-oriented. Breakthroughs in consciousness research could
happen if we encourage self-exploration and spiritual enquiry as well
as third person approaches.
Acknowledgement
My pranam to H.H. Swami Bodhananda* for many insights without
which this paper would not have been possible.
Notes and References
* For more details
See www.sambodh.org
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(1976), Drg-Drsya
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Adi Sankaracharya
(1996), Brahma
Sutras, tr. Swami Vireswarananda
(Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama).
Adi Sankaracharya
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Chalmers, David (1995),
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Menon, Sangeetha (1999),
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Menon, Sangeetha (2001),
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