The
following article is based on a presentation made during the Second International
Conference on Integral Psychology, held at Pondicherry (India), 4-7 January
2001. The text has been published in:
Cornelissen, Matthijs (Ed.) (2001) Consciousness and Its Transformation,
Pondicherry: SAICE
Beyond postmodernism
Towards a future psychology
Kundan
Abstract
Impressed by the apparent
potential of physics to explain, predict and control natural phenomena,
psychology rooted in a Newtonian-reductionist framework embraced a methodology
identical to what is employed by the natural sciences to generate universal,
rational, objective and value-free laws of human behaviour. This gave
psychology the much-coveted status of science. The emergence of a postmodern
worldview has thrown into critical relief the notion of rational, objective
and value-free science or for that matter any knowledge pursuit. This
paper narrates the problem associated with the objectivity of psychological
knowledge by drawing largely from the critique of science by Thomas Kuhn,
which emerged from his analysis of the history of science. Kuhn’s view
leads one to identify the crucial role that paradigm plays in scientific
research. An extension of his arguments, as well as some evidences from
anthropological research, suggests that psychological knowledge is relative
with respect to person, time, culture and paradigm. A meta-analysis of
Kuhn leads one to conclude that his argument bites itself or swallows
itself, giving birth to a peculiar situation where opposite categories
like relative and absolute, objectivity and subjectivity, and the truth
and falsity of facts co-exist.
Against this background,
this paper explores certain means to resolve the impasse generated by
the recognition of relativity and the aforementioned paradox. Postmodernism
is not something that should be feared by academicians; rather it is a
major pointer towards changing our modus operandi of knowledge pursuit.
Mystics have long identified the pursuit of knowledge through mind culminating
in the realization of its relative nature. Mind is not the final summit
in the evolution of mankind. There can be faculties other than mind which
can be used to uncover nature’s truths, and it is not in the spirit of
science to fall prey to scientism. The history of humanity has been a
witness to countless instances where mystics have demonstrated that there
exists a realm of knowledge which can be accessed by silencing and transcending
the mind. This paper thus explores the connection between postmodern thought
and mysticism in reference to psychology.
The origins of scientific
thought in psychology
Psychology’s identification
with science is clearly revealed through a cursory examination of the
contemporary conceptualization of the discipline. Throughout its history,
psychology has been defined in myriad ways. The early psychologists defined
it as the study of mental activity. With the advent of Behaviourism at
the turn of the century, and its central concern with studying only phenomena
that could be objectively measured, psychology came to be described as
the study of behaviour. This definition has been featured in most psychology
textbooks of the 1930’s through the 1960’s. The cycle has come full circle
with the development of cognitive and humanistic/transpersonal psychology,
as most current definitions of psychology make references to both behaviour
and mental processes (Henley, Johnson & Jones, 1989). Despite little
variations most definitions of psychology describe it as science. While
conducting a survey and an analysis of the definitions of psychology in
psychology textbooks published between 1887 and 1987, Henley et al. (1989)
report that “psychology is the study/science” appears in about 80% of
the textbooks of psychology. It is thus apparent that mainstream psychology
considers the discipline to be a science and uses a methodology similar
to what is applied to the study of physical objects.
In the late nineteenth
century, physics rooted in the Newtonian framework was solving puzzle
after puzzle and this led philosophers like J.S. Mill to believe that
by subjecting human beings to a similar kind of experimental setup, they
would be able to isolate cause and effect relationships in quantitative
terms, which would then allow them to generate universal laws of human
behaviour. There is no reason why it should not have happened, for psychology
is intricately entwined with the enigma of our existence. Any system,
thought or methodology that harbours a promise to resolve this mystery
ought to attract seekers of knowledge. But, more than a hundred years
have elapsed since the first experimental lab was established by Wundt
in 1879 and the outcome of this approach has been thousands of theories
mostly at variance with each other (Proshansky, 1976). Confusion is what
pervades this discipline. Consolidating this position, Bruner (1990) notes
that “questions about the nature of mind and its processes, questions
about how we construct our meanings and realities and questions about
shaping of mind still remain largely unanswered”(p. ix).
An earnest review of
these theories leads one to conclude that our approach towards the subject
has been too narrow to embrace the complexity of human nature. How can
we have so many theories of human nature and yet not be able to explain
anything conclusively? But, before we talk about a new paradigm of psychology,
it is important to review the central tenets of the methodology that has
guided psychological research and generated these theories and consequently,
the pitfalls of this approach.
Science was formalized
by Francis Bacon in the seventeenth century when he wrote that in order
to understand ourselves we have to stop consulting Aristotle and start
questioning nature itself. Bacon gave two fundamental laws of science:
induction and deduction which form the basic tenets of positivism, a school
of thought which has dictated the conduct of psychology from the past
to the present. Positivism later developed into logical positivism and
together they are called the “received view of science”. Though logical
positivism and positivism differ in certain ways, induction and deduction
form the bedrock of their methodology proposed for uncovering nature’s
truths.
The problem with induction
and objectivity
Induction starts with
observation, stemming from an unprejudiced mind. The observations lead
to singular statements—referring to a particular state of affairs at a
particular time—that form the body of laws and theories from which scientific
knowledge can be derived. For the singular statements to culminate in
universal laws, an important condition that needs to be met is that the
number of observation statements forming the basis of generalization must
be large (Chalmers, 1982).
Following this, a finite
set of singular statements would lead to a universal law. This was designated
as inductive reasoning and the process as induction. Once the inductive
laws are established, they can be tested at a different place and time.
This is the process of deduction. The essential condition for the methodology
of science is that the observation has to be value free, detached and
objective. The subjective state of the observer, taste and expectation
are not supposed to intrude in the act of observation.
As stated before, an
important premise of induction is that the number of observations must
be large. However, despite a large number of cases showing consistency,
it is not guaranteed that the next event would not be contrary to it.
Hence repeated observation cannot ultimately prove the validity of induction.
For example, no matter how many white swans we may have encountered, it
does not imply that all swans are white; the next that we encounter may
be black (Popper, 1959/92). The inductive principle is considered the
mainstay of science by positivists. They maintain that if it is removed
from the canon of science, science will lose its power to determine the
nature of Truth. But how does one logically prove that the principle of
induction is true in the first place and not an assumption. In other words,
how does one ascertain that the inductive principle helps uncover the
truth? It is argued that since it seems to operate well in a large number
of cases, the premise is correct. This implies that one uses induction
to justify induction and thus the argument assumes circularity. This is
called the problem
of induction. (Popper, 1959/92)
The most serious drawback
with induction is with respect to its claim of objectivity in observation.
It is a very common experience that no two individuals register the same
thing even if the respective images on their retinas are the same. One
does not even require much knowledge of psychology to know that the observer’s
perception is determined by his or her expectations, belief, knowledge,
inner state and psychological make-up.
The contention of an
inductivist, that the true basis of scientific knowledge should proceed
from an unbiased and unprejudiced mind, is further rendered absurd by
the practice of the scientist to consider only such data which are relevant
to his or her research. Since the idea of relevant and irrelevant is always
present during the course of investigation, the possibility of an unbiased
and unprejudiced observer disappears. The investigator or scientist cannot
but be an integral part of the research work and his or her subjectivity
is bound to play an instrumental role in the outcome of the research.
Thus, it can be safely said that the data that are generated by the scientist
are not objective but collected within the larger framework of theory.
They do not have an independent existence, rather they are constructed
within the confines and boundaries of a theory. In other words, data are
theory-laden and objectivity is the last thing that scientists should
claim. Expressing similar concerns, Feyerabend (1993, p. 12) writes:
The history of science,
after all, does not consist of fact and conclusions drawn from facts.
It also contains ideas, interpretation of facts, problems created by conflicting
interpretations, mistakes, and so on. On closer analysis, we find that
science knows no “bare facts” at all but the “facts” that enter our knowledge
are already viewed in a certain way and are, therefore, essentially ideational.
The problem of objectivity
is further compounded by the fact that “we speak more about our observation
of the world rather than of the world, and we do this through a less than
fully adequate language system. The linguistic limitation, by itself causes
problems even if we could overcome other limitations” (Baker, 1991, p.
12). This happens because language does not only describe events, but
also creates a cosmology, a worldview that influences the thought, behaviour
and perception of mankind. When a child begins to learn a language, the
worldview of her ancestors is passed onto her. The pedagogic procedures
used “both shape the ‘appearance’, or
‘phenomenon’, and establish a firm connection with words, so that
finally the phenomena seem to speak for themselves without outside help
or extraneous knowledge” (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 57). The human mind begins
to take many facts of life as givens, and the entire process may be totally
unconscious. Her worldview begins to create what she may observe. Also,
in order to be unprejudiced, one will have to abandon language itself,
which will remove all ability to perceive and to think, as a consequence
of which the practice of science will stop before it begins. Writes Edward
Sapir:
Human beings do not live
in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity
as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular
language that has become the medium of expression of that society. It
is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially
without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental
means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The
fact of the matter is that the “real world” is to a large extent unconsciously
built up on the language habits of the group…. We see and hear and otherwise
experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our community
predispose certain choices of interpretation.
[Cited in Whorf,
1962, p.134]
Even physics, which
right from the beginning has provided a recipe for carrying out psychological
research, has come to recognize that the observer is an inseparable part
of the observation being made. In other words, reality is not independent
of the observer. Thus, Capra (1992, p. 78) observes:
The human observer constitutes
the final link in the chain of observational process, and the properties
of any atomic object can only be understood in terms of object’s interaction
with the observer. This means that the classical ideal of objective description
of nature is no longer valid.
Further, to be objective
means that there should be an intersubjective agreement over an issue,
thought or a sensory experience. Wertheimer (1972), one of the foremost
critics of logical positivism states:
The only way in which
one can tell whether there is an agreement or not is for someone to observe
this agreement. Hence, the criterion for the presence or absence of agreement
is someone’s (ultimately, my) cognition of the presence of absence of
the agreement. Thus, making science public by striving for intersubjective
agreement, can in no way yield the desired result of objectivity in the
sense of independence from the subjective experience of scientists or
a scientist or, better knowers or a particular knower.
[Cited in Tolman,
1992, p. 37]
In short, objectivity
was the cornerstone of the Enlightenment or the Modern era where it was
presumed that science following a –definite methodology would be able
to solve all the mysteries of the world. The unarticulated assumption
was that there is a world, which exists separate from the individual and
it can be understood by wresting out its secret by a rational, unbiased
and value-free observer. Consequently, it created dualism like subject—object
and sharp divisions like fact and value, and objective reality and subjective
feelings. As the above arguments indicate, for an individual to be without
a bias or a value, he or she has to come from nowhere. Values and biases
are implicit to the human condition and dichotomies like subject-object,
and fact-value are a myth.
Sociology of knowledge:
objectivity demystified
Apart from the values,
inner expectations, knowledge, social position and observer’s bias, science
embraces other dynamics as well which can constrain an objective approach
to reality. The spirit of science is to question, but science was losing
its tenor by falling prey to scientism, a kind of dogmatism comparable
to the fundamentalist aspect of any organized religion. Imbued with the
spirit of questioning, Kuhn (1970) questioned the notion of science itself.
His work is significant in that he has made it explicitly clear that science,
like any other human activity, is a social activity which affects and
is affected by the milieu in which it is embedded, and is guided by sociological,
economic, historical and political forces. According to him, science is
practised by communities of scientists and not by isolated men and women.
To understand the workings of science, it is therefore imperative to understand
the scientific community, its accepted and shared norms and beliefs. The
complex nature of sociological factors that operate when any research
is conducted can be appreciated with the help of Figure 1.
Figure 1 [Adapted
from Danziger, 1990]
The innermost circle
represents the immediate social condition in which research is conducted.
The next circle represents the research community that has to accept the
data as scientific knowledge. The outermost circle denotes the wider social
context that embraces the research community. The investigators, the research
community and the society are interconnected in a complex web of affairs,
which has many dimensions. If we analyse the dynamics of the inner circle—the
immediate research conducted for generation of psychological knowledge,
we find that the objectivity of psychological knowledge and the rationale
of the Newtonian framework for psychology are seriously challenged. The
experiments that are conducted are done by human beings on human beings,
in sharp contrast to physical sciences where experiments are conducted
on inanimate objects. With the recognition of experimenter expectancy
effects and demand characteristics, it can be inferred that the experimental
results are codetermined by the social relationship between the experimenter
and the subjects (Danziger, 1990).
As far as the research
community is concerned, Kuhn (1970) points out that scientific practice
is shaped by deep assumptions of the worldview of which the scientist
may be unaware. For meaningful research to take place, the community must
agree upon the goals, the methodologies, and the valid subject matter
in the context of research. The agreement on all these issues would constitute
a framework or a paradigm within which the investigation of nature can
take place. The paradigm has two components—disciplinary matrix and shared
exemplars. The disciplinary matrix consists of a certain fundamental set
of assumptions that are often unstated and not subject to empirical test.
These assumptions form the basis for testing specific hypotheses. For
example, reductionism states that the world can be understood by breaking
it into smaller units until we arrive at a set of fundamental units. This
is an assumption that is not going to be subjected to any kind of an empirical
test, and thus constitutes the part of disciplinary matrix of scientists
who adhere to this belief. As an example, while analysing how Descartes
influenced what was admissible in the scientific canon and what was not,
Kuhn (1970, p. 41) writes:
[A]fter the appearance
of Descartes’ immensely influential scientific writings, most physical
scientists assumed that the universe was composed of microscopic corpuscles
and that all natural phenomena could be explained in terms of corpuscular
shape, size, motion, and interaction. That nest of commitments proved
to be both metaphysical and methodological. As metaphysical, it told scientists
what sort of entities the universe did and did not contain: there was
only shaped matter in motion. As methodological, it told them what ultimate
laws and fundamental explanations must be like: laws must specify corpuscular
motion and interaction, and explanation must reduce any given natural
phenomenon to corpuscular action under these laws. Most important still,
the corpuscular conception of the universe told scientists what many of
their research problems should be.
And again (p. 109,
emphasis mine),
Paradigm functions by
telling the scientist about the entities that nature does or does not
contain and about the ways in which those entities behave. That information
provides a map whose details are elucidated by mature scientific research.
And since nature is too complex and varied to be explored at random, that
map is as essential as observation and experiment to science’s continuing
development. Through the theories they embody, paradigms prove to be constitutive
of research activity.... In learning a paradigm the scientist acquires
theory, methods, and standards together, usually in an inextricable mixture.
The other component
of a paradigm is shared exemplars—the models for investigating new problems
which include the methodology for pursuing the research. The disciplinary
matrix and shared exemplars, by constituting the paradigm, unconsciously
trains a researcher to approach a problem in a specific way which gradually
becomes his/her natural way. In this vein, Leahey (1991, p. 14) writes:
Neither source of data
is comprehensible without training, yet once the scientist learns to interpret
them, he or she will see them in those ways and no others. Thus training
can act as a set of blinders, keeping the scientist from seeing in new
ways. All observation and perception—whether scientific or not—is a matter
of interpretation as numerous psychological examples have shown.
Weber (1946) similarly
contests the notion that science can be free from suppositions ever. It
presupposes that the rules of method and logic are valid, which cannot
be tested by scientific means. Further, facts are meaningless and neutral
in themselves; they become facts when interpreted against a theory comprising
of a priori categories. For example, the measurements made with
the Atwood machine would have meant nothing in the absence of Newton’s
Principia. Varied meanings can be ascribed to the same data.
What once was a Leyden jar became a condenser, as there were changes in
the electrical paradigms. Elucidating how the same entity can be interpreted
in different ways under the influence of different paradigms or theories,
Kuhn (1970, pp. 50-1) writes:
An investigator who hoped
to learn something about what scientists took the atomic theory to be
asked a distinguished physicist and an eminent chemist whether a single
atom of helium was or was not a molecule. Both answered without hesitation,
but their answers were not the same. For the chemist the atom of helium
was a molecule because it behaved like one with respect to the kinetic
theory of gases. For the physicist, on the other hand, the helium atom
was not a molecule because it displayed no molecular spectrum. Presumably
both men were talking about the same particle but they were viewing it
through their own research training and practice.
In short, Kuhn has
shown that science is not as rational and objective as it had been supposed.
Indeed, scientific rationality is a matter of consensus. It involves unexamined
biases and social interests like fame, fortune, love, loyalty and power
of the investigator. A choice of one paradigm over another may be induced
by inner psychological causes or other sociological ones that cannot be
defended by appealing to the office of reason. More often than not, scientists
following the same norms of disinterestedness, objectivity and rationality
arrive at different conclusions. The history of science reveals that there
are many competing theories before one paradigm becomes dominant and all
of them had arisen from experimentation and observation. Comments Kuhn
(1970, p. 4):
[E]arly developmental
stages of most sciences have been characterized by continual competition
between a number of distinct views of nature, each partially derived from,
and all roughly compatible with, the dictates of scientific observation
and method. What differentiated these various schools was not one or another
failure of method—they were all “scientific”—but what we shall come to
call their incommensurable ways of seeing the world and of practicing
science in it. Observation and experience can and must drastically restrict
the range of admissible scientific belief, else there would be no science.
But they cannot alone determine a particular body of such belief. An apparently
arbitrary element, compounded of personal and historical accident, is
always a formative ingredient of beliefs espoused by a given scientific
community at a given time.
The history of science
also demonstrates that scientific knowledge is temporally relative. What
was considered once as science has been later rejected as superstition.
By the same token, what constitutes as scientific knowledge today, which
has been extracted from nature by subjecting it to repeated investigation
may turn out to be error tomorrow under the influence of a different paradigm.
Kuhn (1970, p. 2) states:
[H]istorians confront
growing difficulties in distinguishing the “scientific” component of past
observation and belief from what their predecessors had readily labelled
“error” and “superstition.” The more carefully they study, say, Aristotelian
dynamics, phlogestic chemistry, or caloric thermodynamics, the more certain
they feel that those once current views of –nature were, as a whole, neither
less scientific nor more the product of human idiosyncrasy than those
current today. If these out-of-date beliefs are to be called myths, then
myths can be produced by the same sorts of methods and held for the same
sorts of reasons that now lead to scientific knowledge. If, on the other
hand, they are to be called science, then science has included bodies
of belief quite incompatible with the ones that we hold today.
A committed believer
in science would say that the above stated phenomenon has taken place
because science is cumulative and scientists have refined their theories
in an effort to come closer to a truer and more accurate interpretation
and description of nature. Kuhn disagrees and contends that instead of
science being cumulative, it is revolutionary. A change in the paradigm
changes the worldview of the scientist; or in other words the world comes
to be viewed differently by the scientist. It involves a “reconstruction
of the field from new fundamentals, a reconstruction that changes some
of the field’s most elementary theoretical generalizations as well as
many of its paradigm methods and applications”(Kuhn, 1970. p. 85).
Kuhn holds that it is
difficult to demonstrate the superiority of one paradigm over another
purely on “logical” argument. The primary reason is that the proponents
of the rival paradigms subscribe to a different set of standards and metaphysical
assumptions. The rival paradigms are so incommensurable that no appeal
to “rationality” can settle the issue as Feyerabend (1976) writes:
Transition to criteria
not involving content thus turns theory choice from a rational and “objective”
and rather one dimensional routine into a complex discussion involving
conflicting preference and propaganda will play a major role in it, as
it does in all cases involving preferences.
[Cited in Chalmers,
1982, p.138]
To complete this discussion
let us analyse the outermost circle depicted in Figure 1. The pursuit
of knowledge is very intimately connected with the society in which it
develops; the sociology of knowledge very aptly discusses the dynamics
operating therein which determine the subject matter of psychology or
any discipline for that matter. The anti-theistic ideas of scientific
psychology are a case in point. Science in order to establish its identity
had to struggle against the Church which had usurped all powers to arbitrate
every activity of man and mankind. It had restricted the freedom of inquiry
and held courts of inquisition to prosecute men like Galileo and Descartes
and all those who differed from the scriptures. Moreover it had waged
holy wars in the name of religion and caused much bloodshed. Against this
backdrop, science dissociated itself from anything that had to do with
God or with supernatural forms of existence. In conclusion, the social
and historical forces do play a major role in the development of a subject
(see Danziger 1990; Leahey 1991, for details).
It is being increasingly
realized that each society has its own vision of reality that shapes the
perception and thoughts of its inhabitants. This helps them to negotiate
their life with different images, symbols, metaphors and institutions
in a unique way that may be incommensurable with that of another society.
It would be worthwhile to analyse the notion of the self in this light.
Under the auspices of Cartesian metaphysics, self has been described by
Western philosophers as universal, objective, ahistoric, non-contextual
and authentic. This dominant paradigm suggests that the true and authentic
self is atomistic, individualistic and non-social. The universality of
this view is seriously challenged when different cultures are studied
on their own terms, without the preconception that they are inferior.
For example, in India according to the Bhagavad Gita, the idea of a separate, individualistic, isolated
and egoistic self is false and illusory. The egoistic self which creates
selfish desires, hatred, attachment, craving, greed, conceit etc. is viewed
as the cause of ignorance and suffering; and it is culturally expected
that one transcend this egoistic self in order to be transported into
a state of wisdom, knowledge, calm and peace.
Some Western philosophers
too have contested this Cartesian idea of self and have argued that the
self is situated and shaped by social, cultural, economic and historical
contexts. For example, Marx argued that the nature of man (or woman) is
the product of material conditions. Allen (1997) states that “[s]elf is
not something abstract, static, ahistoric and given. On the contrary,
self is dynamic, complex and relational; it is socially, culturally and
historically constituted and developed through an ongoing dialectical
process” (p. 22).
Anthropology has challenged
the uniformitarian view of humans—emerging from the Enlightenment concept—that
the essence and truth of human beings is universal and constant, independent
of time and culture. For instance, the Oedipal complex espoused by Freud
as universally valid did not hold ground when Malinowski (1927) tried
to test its truth in matriarchal societies. Also, Mead (1928) challenged
the psychologist G. Stanley Hall’s view that adolescence is a period of
“storm and stress” which he held to be universally true. Mead found that
the adolescents of Samoa Island did not manifest a period of storm and
stress. Geertz (1973, p. 35-6) comments:
[A]nthropology… is firm
in conviction that men unmodified by the customs of particular places
do not in fact exist, have never existed, and most important, could not
in the very nature of the case exist…. The circumstance makes the drawing
of a line between what is natural, universal, and constant in man and
what is conventional, local and variable extremely difficult.
What is intelligent,
practical, viable and noble in one culture may be considered as foolish
and lowly from the perspective of another culture. Torgovnick (1990) observes
that it is very difficult to asses what is “modern,” what is “primitive,”
what is “savage” and what is “civilized.” Montaigne (1877) observes that
we designate anything that is not in conformity with our habits and customs
as barbaric, for we have no criterion for judging the customs of others
other than our own. Levi Strauss (1979) comments that the minds of “primitives”
are not inferior constitutionally; it is just that they are different,
shaped according to the demands that their surroundings and environment
present.
The above line of argument
indicates that psychology and all forms of knowledge—there is an intimate
connection between psychology and knowledge—are relative with respect
to individual, time, culture and paradigm. But incidentally, this is a
statement suggesting an absolute truth. Similarly, experimental psychology
has devised experiments (for example, the duck-rabbit experiment), the
results of which show that the perception of reality is necessarily subjective.
But while stating this, it also makes a statement which embodies an objective
validity. So a fact discovered by psychology becomes subjective and objective
at the same time leading to a paradoxical and a peculiar situation.
A meta-analysis of Kuhn’s
arguments culminates in a situation which is no different. One of the
chief themes of his theses is that paradigms guide research in terms of
observation and interpretation of data. If his premise is true—which of
course, he has supported with a lot of evidence—then by extension it can
be said that he has culled out data from the body of the history of science
to support his theory that paradigms guide research. In other words, the
data were collected with the theory—paradigm guides research— already
in his mind. As soon as we recognize this, Kuhn’s arguments turn on themselves,
thus assuming a circularity. A paradoxical situation
emerges again: Kuhn’s arguments are true and false at the same time. They are true because there are evidences to support
his claim and false because he contradicts himself by inviting his arguments
on himself.
Secondly, Kuhn has cited
evidence to show that facts and data have no meaning in themselves; they
acquire meaning when interpreted against a theory or framework. There
is an implicit circularity and paradox here too. By force of Kuhn’s arguments,
it can be argued that the evidence that he has used to demonstrate the
truth of his arguments are meaningful only against his contention that
evidence has no meaning in the absence of a framework. Evidence lends
support to his theory whereas a similar kind of contradiction as described
above and the fact of being oblivious to his own subjectivity, while attributing
the crucial role of the scientist’s subjectivity in guiding research,
renders Kuhn’s theory inadmissible. If the evidence of other scientists
is not sacrosanct, it can as well be said that Kuhn’s is not either.
In view of these circularities
and paradoxes, does this mean that the pursuit of knowledge and psychology
approaches a dead end? Does this mean that the impasse cannot be resolved?
The answer is a resounding no if we begin to analyse the mystical traditions.
If not, then how does
one reconcile to the relative truth of the postmodernists stated in an
absolute way, which results in a modern koan (if koan can be loosely translated to mean a puzzle-like situation)?
Postmodernism is rejected
by many on the ground that it leads to solipsism i.e. the self of an individual
is the only reality; the only knowledge that he or she can have is about
his or her own self and nothing else. An evaluation of mystical traditions
allows us to perceive that solipsism is not as formidable as it has been
made out to be. For all mystical knowledge starts when we start seeing
the self. Let us examine how mysticism or spirituality, while offering
the solution of extricating ourselves from the problem of relativity,
the aforementioned koan and solipsism, can be an alternative paradigm to
psychology research.
Beyond mind: a step
ahead of postmodernism
The relativism to
which postmodernism eventually culminates is not a new realization in
the history of mankind. The mystics since time immemorial and across all
cultures have recognized the pursuit of knowledge through mind resulting
in agnosticism and relativism. References to mind, with reason and logic
as its instruments, as an incompetent and inferior tool for such an endeavour
is a common feature in mystical literature. Referring to this limitation
of knowledge pursued through mind, Sri Aurobindo states:
A certain kind of Agnosticism
is the final truth of all knowledge. For when we come to an end of whatever
path, the universe appears as only a symbol or an appearance of an unknowable
Reality which translates itself here into different systems of values,
physical values, vital and sensational values, intellectual, ideal and
spiritual values. Sri Aurobindo, The
Life Divine, p. 12
The knowledge pursuit
in the modernistic tradition is based on logic, reasoning and an objective
agreement of evidences. Recognizing the limitation of such an approach
and the relativity of reason, Sri Aurobindo writes:
You believe according
to your faith, which is quite natural, he believes according to his opinion,
which is natural also, but no better so far as the likelihood of getting
at the true truth of things is in question. His opinion is according to
his reason… How is reasoning to show which is right? The opposing parties
can argue till they are blue in their face—they won’t be anywhere nearer
a decision… But who can look at the world as it is and say that the trend
of things is always (or ever) according to the right reason—whatever this
thing called the right reason may be? As a matter of fact there is no
universal infallible reason which can decide and be the umpire between
conflicting opinions; there is only my reason, your reason, X’s reason,
Y’s reason multiplied up to a discordant innumerable. Each reasons according
to his view of things, his opinion, that is his mental constitution and
mental preference.
Sri Aurobindo, Letters
on Yoga, pp. 164-65
Mind according to
the mystics cannot perceive the Reality as a whole. It tends to classify,
discriminate, categorize, divide, compare and measure. This indeed can
be validated if we examine the large body of what we call psychological
knowledge. Two prevalent practices that underlie the pursuit of psychology
are through the ceteris paribus clause, and models. Theories are built
by varying some variables while keeping others constant in order to discover
laws of behaviour. Common sense observation can tell us that our lives
do not operate that way; there is a gamut of factors operating on us as
individuals which cannot, by virtue of the scientific methodology applied,
identify the laws. The other practice is the pursuit of psychology through
models. Models as such do not represent the reality but take a few variables
in disregard to others to create a picture of reality. Apropos to such
a view, Sri Aurobindo writes:
Mind cannot arrive at
Truth; it can only make some constructed figure that tries to represent
it or a combination of figures…. There have been hundreds of these systems
and formulas and there can be hundreds more, but none can be definitive.
Sri Aurobindo, Letters
on Yoga, p. 157
Minds build concepts
and concepts are an integral part of prevalent psychology, which are defined
and redefined by the psychologists during the course of their investigation
of psychological phenomenon. The postmodern discourse has rendered all
categories and definitions fluid, porous, vague, ambiguous and uncertain.
We cannot talk about “personality”, “identity”, “sanity”, “normality”
etc. with as much certainty as we used to in the past. It has identified
that all categories and definitions are not fixed but subject to change
with time and place. There is a larger meta-structure on which these edifices
are built.
It is here that a deep and intimate connection between postmodern thought
and mysticism lies. The confusion generated by the discourse has the seed
of a paradigm shift in the knowledge of ultimate reality and psychology.
The mystics have stressed that the truth of our existence
cannot be understood in terms of categories and concepts; knowledge lies
beyond these. In the words of Thich Naht Hanh (1995, pp. 41-43):
The world of concepts
is not the world of reality. Conceptual knowledge is not the perfect instrument
for studying truth. Words are inadequate to express the truth of ultimate
–reality… But if conceptual knowledge is fallible, what other instruments
should we use to grasp reality? According to Buddhism, we can only reach
reality through direct experience. Study and speculation are based on
concepts. In conceptualizing we cut reality into smaller pieces that seem
to be independent of one another. This manner of conceiving things is
called imaginative and discriminative knowledge (Vikalpa) according to
Vijñanavadin School of Buddhism. The faculty that directly experiences
reality without passing through concepts is called non-discriminative
and non-imaginative wisdom (nirvikalpa–jñana). This wisdom is the fruit
of meditation. It is a direct and perfect knowledge of reality, a form
of understanding in which one does not distinguish between subject and
object. It cannot be conceived by the intellect or expressed by language.
Concepts and categories
have the potential to imprison the mind. All mental knowledge binds the
intuitive faculties which are better instruments for the perception of
Truth. A Socrates-like position that the only thing one knows is that
one knows nothing is a perfect condition for the higher reality to unfold.
With regards to the
koan, the mystics say that a concept and its opposite are
parts of a unified whole but it is not within the ambit of mind—rational
and logical—to resolve it. It can be only done by opening up the intuitive
faculties within or by going into higher levels of consciousness by silencing
the thoughts and by becoming aware. The culprit opposing such reconciliation
is the logical mind referred to as Sem by Tibetan
Buddhists about which Sri Aurobindo writes:
Truth is not logical;
it contains logic but is not contained by it. A particular syllogism may
be true, so far as it goes, covering a sharply limited set of facts, but
even a set of syllogisms cannot exhaust truth on a general subject, for
the simple reason that they necessarily ignore a number of equally valid
premises, facts or possibilities which support a modified or contrary
view. Sri Aurobindo, Essays Divine and Human,
p. 10
According to the Buddhists,
the world exists as an inseparable and reconciled whole of opposites.
It is black which creates white; good that creates evil; valleys that
create mountains; friends that creates enemies. All contradictions and
oppositions, seen from a slightly different perspective reveal that they
are one and essential whole. The opposites are not against each other
but complement each other. Darkness is born out of light and day is born
out of night. Buddhists maintain that existence is a synthesis of opposites
but the transcendence of the discursive mind is a must for the unity to
reveal itself and unfold. In the poetic words of Lao Tzu:
Since the world points
up beauty as such,
There is ugliness too,
If goodness is taken as
goodness,
Wickedness enters as well.
For is and is-not come
together;
Hard and easy are complementary;
Long and short are relative;
High and low are comparative;
Pitch and sound make harmony;
Before and after are a
sequence.
Blackney, 1955,
p. 2
Postmodernism, by
thus acknowledging the relative nature of categories and concepts can
allow us to perceive the limitations of mind and brings us to the portals
from where we can glimpse the higher realities beyond mind. But the essential
condition, which postmodernism has yet to achieve is to transcend this
relativity of mind. It is still struggling to wriggle out of this impasse.
An assimilation of postmodern thought into oneself permits the seeker
of knowledge to make his or her mind fluid and plastic or in the words
of the mystics “to empty her mind”. The empty mind or a mind devoid of
all concepts is metaphorically compared to a sea which is absolutely calm.
It is in this state, non-attached to conceptualized knowledge, that higher
knowledge, called the wisdom mind by the mystics, manifests. Nyoshul Khe
Rinpoche expresses this most beautifully:
Profound and tranquil, free from complexity,
Uncompounded luminous clarity,
Beyond the mind of conceptual ideas;
There is the depth of mind of the victorious Ones.
In this there is not a thing to be removed,
Nor anything that needs to be added.
It is merely the immaculate
Looking naturally at itself.
[Cited in Rinpoche, 1991, p. 49]
As stated earlier,
Western psychology began the investigation of its subject matter with
the notion of an observer and the observed where the observer and the
observed, were distinctly presumed to be separate and it was the task
of the observer to discover the truth. Postmodern discourse has identified
that the observer and the observed are interdependent and the subject
of their knowledge is a product of the interaction between the two. While
this recognition has made the rigid categorization of subject and object
vague, it is being perceived as a precipitator of crisis among the academicians.
In contrast, according to Zen Buddhism, this is not the end of knowledge,
rather the beginning. Buddhists argue that knowledge rooted in distinction
and discrimination—like “subject” and “object”, “knower” and “knowledge”—result
in Vikalpa which is not the reflection of reality. Psychological
knowledge following the modernistic (Newtonian-reductionist or Cartesian)
paradigm can be said to be based on the principle of Vikalpa. Postmodern thought, which recognizes the interconnectedness
and interdependence of the observer and the observed, reflects knowledge
based on the principle of Paratantra. Paratantra is
the true basis of knowledge which can lead to the transcendence of Vikalpa which will further guide the seeker to Tathata or Enlightenment where the true identity of things
is revealed. Enlightenment is not an abstract state based on speculation
and imagination but manifests a reality based on concrete experience.
Sri Aurobindo while giving an account of his first major spiritual experience
writes:
… to reach Nirvana was
the first radical result of my own Yoga. It threw me suddenly into a condition
above and without thought, unstained by any mental or vital movement;
there was no ego, no real world—only when one looked through the immobile
senses, something perceived or bore upon its sheer silence a world of
empty forms, materialised shadows without true substance. There was no
One or many even, only just absolutely That, featureless, relationless,
sheer indescribable, unthinkable, absolute, yet supremely real and solely
real. This was no mental realisation nor something glimpsed somewhere
above,—no abstraction,—it was positive, the only positive reality,—although
not a spatial physical world, pervading, –occupying or rather flooding
and drowning this semblance of a physical world leaving no room or space
for any reality but itself, allowing nothing else to seem at all actual,
positive or substantial. Sri Aurobindo, On Himself, p. 101
Stressing that the
reality experienced was without words or concepts, he further states:
One has to arrive at
spiritual knowledge through experience and a consciousness of things which
arises directly out of that experience or else underlies or is involved
in it. This kind of knowledge, then, is fundamentally a consciousness
and not a thought or formulated idea. For instance, my first major experience…
came after and by the exclusion and silencing of all thought—there was,
first, what might be called a spiritually substantial or concrete consciousness
of stillness and silence, then the awareness of some sole and supreme
Reality in whose presence things existed only as forms but forms not at
all substantial or real or concrete; but this was all apparent to a spiritual
perception and essential and impersonal sense and there was not the least
concept or idea of reality or unreality or any other notion, for all concept
or idea was hushed or rather entirely absent in the absolute stillness.
These things were known directly through the pure consciousness and not
through the mind, so there was no need of concepts or words or names.
Sri Aurobindo, On
Himself, p. 87
Thus, it is increasingly
clear that postmodernism is just a step short of a kind of knowledge pursuit
which promises to reveal the deeper aspects of human existence; the levels
of existence which lie beyond mind. In other words, postmodernism, if
allowed to proceed unhindered, precedes the development of a paradigm
where the exploration of the deeper and higher realms of mind will be
taken up on a large scale by seekers of knowledge unlike in the past where
mystics have been isolated instances. It is gradually leading psychology
from a science of mind and behaviour to a science of consciousness. Consequently,
“Psychology ought to be rather than is the science of consciousness” (Sri
Aurobindo, Essays Divine and
Human, p. 316). Identifying
that the basis of human behaviour lies much deeper in the realm of consciousness
and nothing much can be achieved by studying the outer aspects, Sri Aurobindo
explains:
Psychology is the science
of consciousness and its status and operations in Nature and, if that
can be glimpsed or experienced, its status and operations beyond what
we know as Nature.
It is not enough to observe
and know the movements of our surface nature and the superficial nature
of other living creatures just as it [is] not enough for Science to observe
and know as electricity only the movements of lightning in the clouds
or for the astronomer to observe and know only those movements and properties
of the stars that are visible to the unaided eyes. Here as there a whole
world of occult phenomena have to be laid bare and brought under control
before the psychologist can hope to be master of his province.
Our observable consciousness,
that which we call ourselves, is only the little visible part of our being.
It is a small field below which are depths and farther depths and widths
and ever wider widths which support and supply it but to which it has
no visible access. All that is our self, our being,—what we see at the
top is only our ego and its visible nature.
Even the movements of this
little surface nature cannot be understood nor its true law discovered
until we know all that is below or behind and supplies it—and know too
all that is around is and above.
Sri Aurobindo, Essays Divine and Human,
pp. 316-17
Contrary to the conventional
practice in psychological research where one endeavours to discover laws
by observation of others, this paradigm as enunciated by Sri Aurobindo
and other mystics bases the study of one’s own self as its subject matter.
Psychology as the science of consciousness should be such where “one must
proceed from the knowledge of oneself to the knowledge of others” (Sri
Aurobindo, Essays in Philosophy and Yoga,
p. 177). Solipsism thus assumes a central position in this research. But
whereas solipsism refers to an individual self, mysticism goes much beyond.
It speaks of the discovery of one Self which is present in all and transcendent
to all. The Hindus call this as Brahma or Purusha, Christians as God, Muslims as Allah and Buddhists as Dharmakaya. The pronouncements of a few mystics will substantiate
this:
All creatures have existed
eternally in the divine essence, as in their exemplar. So far as they
conform to the divine idea, all beings were, before their creation, one
thing with the essence of God. (God creates into time what was and is
in eternity.) Eternally, all creatures are God in God… So far as they
are in God, they are the same life, the same essence, the same power,
the same One, and nothing less.
Suso
When is a man in mere
understanding? I answer, “When a man sees one thing separated from another.”
And when is a man above mere understanding? That I can tell you: “When
a man sees All in all, then a man stands beyond mere understanding.”
Eckhart
Pursue not the outer
entanglements,
Dwell not in the inner
void;
Be serene in the oneness
of things,
And dualism vanishes
of itself.
………………………………..
The two exist because
of the One;
But hold not even to
this One.
When a mind is not disturbed,
The ten thousand things
offer no offence…
If an eye never falls
asleep,
All dreams will cease
of themselves;
If the Mind retains its
absoluteness,
The ten thousand things
are of one substance.
When the deep mystery
of one Suchness is fathomed,
All of a sudden we forget
the external entanglements;
When the ten thousand
things are viewed in their oneness,
We return to the origin
and remain where we have always been…
One in all,
All in One—
If only this is realized,
No more worry about not
being perfect!
The Third Patriarch
of Zen
One Nature, perfect and
pervading, circulates in all natures,
One Reality, all-comprehensive,
contains within itself all realities.
The one Moon reflects
itself wherever there is a sheet of water,
And all the moons in
the waters are embraced within the one Moon.
The Dharma-body (the
Absolute) of all the Buddhas enters into my own being.
And my own being is found
in union with theirs…
Yung-chia Ta-shih
Behold but One in all
things; it is the second that leads you astray. Kabir
[All cited in Huxley, 1946/94, pp. 9-88]
It is the promise
of the mystics that by knowing our self, we would know all. “Know thyself”
is an age-old dictum. Mystics hold that all the operations behind our
psychological self as well as that of the others will proceed from a sure
ground of clear vision of things. They call this the opening of the third
eye—an eye that sees even when the physical eye is closed. This can be
done by the process of yoga—a conscious union with our Self. Sri Aurobindo
writes:
Since the Self which
we come to realise by the path of knowledge is not only the reality which
lies behind and supports the states and movements of our psychological
being, but also that transcendent and universal Existence which has manifested
itself in all the movements of the universal, the knowledge of the Self
includes also the knowledge of the principles of Being, its fundamental
modes and its relations with the principles of the phenomenal universe.
This was what was meant by the Upanishad when it spoke of the Brahman
as that which being known all is known. It has to be realised first as
the pure principle of existence, afterwards, says the Upanishad, its essential
modes become clear to the soul which realises it. We may indeed, before
realisation, try to analyse by the metaphysical reason and even understand
intellectually what Being is and what the world is, but such metaphysical
understanding is not the Knowledge. Moreover, we may have the realisation
in knowledge and vision, but this is incomplete without realisation in
the entire soul-experience and the unity of all our being with that which
we realise. It is the science of Yoga to know and the art of Yoga to be
unified with the Highest so that we may live in the Self and act from
the supreme poise, becoming one not only in the conscious essence but
in the conscious law of our being with the transcendent Divine whom all
things and creatures, whether ignorantly or with partial knowledge and
experience, seek to express through the lower law of their members. To
know the highest Truth and to be in harmony with it is the condition of
right being, to express it in all that we are, experience and do is the
condition of right living. Sri Aurobindo, The Synthesis of Yoga,
p. 374-75
To sum up, postmodern
thought is qualified as being nihilist in nature and purpose. As it is
apparent, it is not a negative nihilism; rather if properly interpreted
posits and envisions a bright future for mankind. It would be very unsettling,
anxiety provoking and tumultuous in the beginning but then the quest for
knowledge has never been and never can be a smooth exercise. It warrants
looking into ourselves and examining closely and intricately our biases,
prejudices and assumptions. What postmodernism anticipates is the popularity
of Eternal Religion or the Perennial Philosophy among academicians on
a large scale. The study of consciousness is the future of psychology.
In my opinion, this will happen in what Sri Aurobindo calls the Spiritual
age. In his all encompassing spiritual vision, the Spiritual age is preceded
by the Subjective age and this by an age dominated by anarchist thoughts.
Since Postmodernism has already heralded the age characterized by anarchist
and nihilist thoughts, the possibility of the study of a greater psychology
through the yogic methodology is only a matter of time.
Acknowledgements
I would like to express
my heart-felt gratitude to my teacher Suneet Varma, Ph.D., for having
introduced me to the ideas of postmodernism, and for having given invaluable
comments on an early draft of this paper. I would also like to thank Jorge
Ferrer, Ph.D. and Bahman Shirazi, Ph.D. for their encouragement and editorial
assistance. My special thanks to Mr. Rajiv Malhotra, who made the participation
in the conference possible by having funded the travel.
This paper is dedicated
to Sri Aurobindo and the Mother, who have transformed my life.
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