The science of affect:
Some Indian insights

Girishwar Misra1

The eco-cultural context of India offers unique scenario of continuity and change in the life experiences at physical, mental, and spiritual levels. At the same time, the traditional wisdom enshrined in texts presents a rich discursive account of affective processes. With this in view an appraisal of the state of theoretical-empirical work dealing with different facets of affect, particularly those pertaining to emotional and motivational processes in India is presented. It is concluded that the Indian worldview engaging self-processes as well as contextual factors emerges central to the shaping of affective life and well being of the people. The Indian life condition is heterogeneous and its cultural meaning systems are sustained by the various cultural practices. The rituals, practices, and symbols allow relating people to the embodied form of emotions. The aesthetic criteria and sensibility are, therefore, relevant to understand alternative perspective on human understanding. Perhaps, people in indigenous discourses about emotions reveal the most radically distinctive level of cultural experience for any society. Emotions, in the mainstream psychological discourses, have largely been treated as physiological and therefore above culture. It has been argued that emotions have evolved and documentation of commonality across species is quite impressive. As we shall see the studies across cultures, however, do reveal differences in the experience of emotions, in their recognition, and differences in intensity.

Recent years have evinced revival of interest in the study of emotions. This is quite understandable. If we look around the contemporary world, the dominant scenario unambiguously points towards major upheavals in the emotional domain. The desires, passions, and moods are the key players in designing the world of our experience. The quality of personal and social lives is suffering from conflicts, disorders, and pathologies of various kinds. In the developed countries, the scenario is changing very fast. As Mestrovic (1997) notes, emotions are strongly becoming attached to objects and less to other people. The marketing of feelings has now gone so far that advertisements these days sell feelings that have no relationship to the product at all. There is a growing tendency to endorse what he terms affective individualism. That is, we seem to have more feelings and pay more attention to them, but seem to have fewer feelings about others and the state of the world and pay less attention to them. This necessitates reexamining our assumptions and perspectives on emotions.

Fortunately, psychology’s engagement with the study of the various facets of affect and emotion has outgrown its traditional image of negative and irrational mental phenomena characterizing some kind of pathology. There are interesting formulations of not only intelligent emotions but emotional intelligence too. The revival of interest in emotions is now directed towards the positive side of human life that facilitates personal growth, well being, and health. At the same time there is increasing awareness of the fact that emotions do not belong to a natural category (see Russell, 2003). Against this backdrop, this paper attempts to examine the efforts made to put emotions in cultural context and to share the understanding of emotional phenomena in the Indian context.

Culture and emotions

The emotionality of our lived experiences is a common realization. It is difficult to recollect a moment when we are not feeling one or the other kind of emotion. While the question whether emotion is a more primitive form of consciousness that in humans developed into full-fledged self-awareness is answered in different ways, there seems to be a general consensus on the adaptive function of emotions. In fact, the experience of emotions is often extended to animals. Also, while emotions were less researched than thought processes, it is increasingly documented that they influence the entire spectrum of cognitive processes including, memory, perception, communication, and decision-making. They also create beliefs and desires and tell what is salient. We learn emotions like language and have their own grammar, syntax, and semantics (De Sousa, 1987). As Mandler (1984) suggests, emotions offer the behaving individual with the most general view of the world that is consistent with current needs, goals, and situations. At the same time, cognitive processes also shape emotions. In particular, appraisal is central to the emotional experience (Lazarus, 1991). Thus while emotions are genetically determined, they are susceptible to social variables and personal meanings. This realization makes culture central to the understanding of emotional processes. However, the mainstream research has viewed physiological or bodily base of emotion basic and presumed the evolutionary continuities as a foundation. This has nurtured and consolidated a view that there are some primary or basic emotions, which are prepackaged and prewired (Darwin, 1872; James, 1884).

The relationship between culture and emotion has been approached from many perspectives. The researchers have been engaged in trying to answer questions like what kind of entities are the emotions, and what is their objective or ontological status? How are they recognized? How do they get expressed in the word? What is the mode of their existence? Are there basic emotions? What are the functions of emotions? Are there universal antecedents of emotions? What is the relationship between cognition and emotion? Is there emotion specific physiology? Can we control our emotions? Can emotions be non-conscious? What is the nature of subjective experience related to emotion? As Ekman (2003) has noted emotions are “about something that matters to the person. ... We become aware of being emotional once the emotion has begun, when the appraisal is complete. .. we become emotional about matters that were relevant to our ancestors as well as ones we have found to matter in our own lives. .. The desire to experience or not experience an emotion motivates much of our behaviour” (p. 216).

The studies of emotion lexicon do not unequivocally establish the idea of basic emotions (Mesquita & Frijda, 1992; Wierzbicka, 1992). Japanese amai, Illongot’s liget, Indian lajja (Shweder, 1993), masti and bhakti (see Paranjpe, 1998; Lynch, 1990), do not justify the basic emotion approach. The basic emotion approach has difficulty on account of too much emphasis on intraindividual states, rather than processes in context. The focus has been on potential rather than prevalence. In this approach, universality and cultural specificity are held to be mutually exclusive.

Researchers often viewed the observed similarity in facial expressions of emotions in different cultures as an indication of universality of a number of basic emotions (Ekman, 1972, Izard, 1977). The cross-cultural recognition of facial expressions and antecedent conditions were used as supportive evidence. It is also accepted that facial emotions of all cultures are expressed in the same way, although the culture specific display norms may interfere. As Ekman (2003) has recently observed all of us“experience the same emotions, but we all experience them differently”(p. 213).

It is argued that basic emotions are stored in an innate facial affect programme and cultural display rules affect these expressions in accordance with the social context. In a recent study Mandal, Harizuku, Bhushan, and Mishra (2001) examined cultural variation in hemifacial asymmetry of emotion expressions among Japanese, Oriental Indians, and North American participants. It was noted that cultures did not vary for their distinctiveness of facial expressions. However, Japanese showed a right hemifacial bias for negative emotions; and negative emotion expressions were least distinctly identifiable in Japanese faces followed by Indian and North American faces (see Mandal, 2004).

The multi componential view (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991) maintains that an emotion comprises of an antecedent event, appraisal, physiological change, change in action readiness, change in cognitive readiness, change in cognitive functioning, and change in regulator process. It centres on the emotion experience and draws attention towards cross-cultural variability of each of the components independently. The components are thought to change somewhat independently of each other. Of course, mutual influences are also recognized. The work of Scherer (1997) does not show very strong cultural effects. The study, however, is limited in the sampling of cultures. Roseman, Dhawan, Rettek, Naidu, and Thapa (1995) found that Indians reported lower overall intensity of emotions than their American counterparts. The cultural differences in emotional intensity were mediated by appraisal differences. On the whole, the evidence supports for similarities between appraisals and emotion experience. Similar emotions are characterized by a similar core action readiness and same set of action readiness modes explains a significant part of the variance in emotions. However, emotions in different languages tend to have a culture specific action readiness profile. The approach is limited to self-report data. It is a compartmentalized study of emotions. They do not provide any direction to study of cultural differences in emotions.

It is becoming increasingly clear that in many cultures, including the Indian culture, emotions are primarily relational or interactive phenomena rather than individual. The cultural psychological tradition has questioned the assumption of psychic unity or uniformity and has proposed the idea of psychological pluralism. It views culture as meanings and interpretive schemes. It recognizes the role of everyday discourse and social interpretation. The differences in the experience of emotions, in their recognition, and differences in intensity across different cultures are considered legitimate. Markus and Kitayama (1991) propose that it is the cultural frame interpretive grid, or meaning system, or schema that makes different things to occasion the diverse experiences as providing feelings of sadness, joy. A cultural framework of independence and inter dependence. Cultural frames tell what an emotion is. The emotional experience is defined by the relational events, which get reflected in emotional response tendencies (see Adams & Markus, 2001). Thus it is clear that a physiological account of emotion is insufficient. 

Considering emotions as culturally structured phenomena, Shweder (1993) takes the position that “emotion terms are names for particular interpretive schemes of particular story like, script like or narrative kind of that any people in the world might (or might not) make use of to give meaning and shape to their somatic and affective ‘feelings’. More specifically, feelings (both affective and somatic) have the shape and meaning of an emotion when they are experienced as a perception of some self-relevant condition of the world and as a plan of action for the protection of dignity, honor, and self esteem” (Pp.32- 33). Similarly, Markus and Kitayama (1994) make a case for the organization of emotions in the collectivist cultures around the interdependent self-construal. The subjectivity is more important in the case of western world where the independent self is more prevalent. The social sharing of emotions is limited. The cultural perspective emphasizes on the bi-directional relationship between culture and emotion. The emphasis is on cultural constitution of emotions.

The Indian perspective on emotions

Maitri-karuna-mudiao-upeksha-punyapunya vishayanam bhavnat chittaprasadam 2

Patanjali

In the Indian context self, wisdom, and affect are interlinked in a complex manner (see Misra, 2001, 2003; Misra, Suvasini & Srivastava, 2002; Srivastava & Misra, 2003). It goes beyond the dichotomies of reason and passion and forges a case for a more comprehensive framework in which affect and cognition become interdependent. The people do share such views even today and consider intellect as multifaceted comprising of cognitive, social, entreprenurial and emotional competencies  (Misra & Srivastava, 2002; Srivastava & Misra, 1999). The contemporary research by Indian researchers in the affective domain (see Agarwal, 1998; Gergen, Glurece, Lock, & Misra, 1996; Misra, 2003; Misra & Gergen, 1993) shows a clear trend towards greater sensitivity to the cultural context in terms of issues, concepts, and methods. The first phase continued up to 1960s. The acceptance of western models was predominant and attention was paid to assume the universality of the concepts without any examination of their suitability to the cultural context. The psychodynamic approach with emphasis on psychoanalysis was its foundation (Ray, 2001).

The second phase started in 1970s when researchers started taking the cultural context seriously and ventured to make certain innovations in conceptualization. Some examples of this shift can be seen in the following: Prayag Mehta’s notion of social achievement motivation, D. Sinha‘s analysis of the motivation of villagers, B. N. Mukherjee’s notion of achievement values, Uday Pareek’s concept of extension motive, J. B. P. Sinha’s concept of dependence proneness. This tradition continued and by paying attention to culturally important features of motivation and affect, important work has been undertaken on approval, time perspective, expectancy, attribution, justice, and sharing. Sagar Sharma and his colleagues took the cultural factors into account in the area of anxiety.

The third phase has started in 1980s when researchers tried to question paradigmatic assumptions and moved towards indigenization in important ways. Important developments have taken place in applied area of organizational psychology (see Kanungo & Mendonca, 1994). Agarwal and Misra’s analysis of achievement cognition (Agarwal & Misra, 1988, 1989; Misra & Agarwarl, 1985; Singhal & Misra, 1994), Khandwala‘s notion of pioneering innovative motive and Chakraborty’s (2001) applications of Vedanta, like chittashudhi (purification of mind), indicate new directions to organizational behaviour. Also, Pandey and Naidu’s (1992) conceptualization of anasakti and Tripathi’s work on intrinsic motivation and goals are important. Analysis of contentment (Singh & Misra, 2000), peace (Bhawuk, 2000), anger and aggression (Singh & Misra, 1997), social emotions like envy and forgiveness (Misra, Verma & Gupta, 2002), positive emotions (Misra, Chugh & Arora, 2004; Srivastava & Misra, 2003), emotional intelligence (Sibia, Srivastava & Misra, 2003), and development of emotions in children (Batra, 1998; Rath & Babu, 2003) have been undertaken. Mandal (2004) has been systematically investigating judgment of facial expression of emotions in different groups. These studies indicate increasing interest of Indian researchers to analyze emotional processes in the contemporary cultural context. The recent issue of Psychological Studies edited by Suar and Misra(Vol 49, Numbers 3-4), the oldest surviving psychology journal of India, is focused on emotions. It has contributions in the areas of emotional intelligence, emotion and health, and emotions and schooling. These developments indicate that emotion and affect are getting increasingly greater significance.

The indigenous perspective

Noting the possibility of culturally specific understanding of emotional experience we may now turn our attention to the emotion discourse in Indian thought which offers a sensibility that directs our attention to certain unique aspects of emotion that are indigenous in their origins but universal in their implications. Indian thinkers have developed a very rich system of thought dealing with poetic, dramaturgical and aesthetic experiences that have direct bearing on the psychology of emotions (see Gnoli, 1956; Jain, 1994; Kapur, 1998; Lynch, 1990; Misra, 2004; Pandey, 1959; Paranjpe, 1998; Shweder, 1993; Sinha, 1961).

The theory of rasa was proposed as the basis on which Indian poetics rests. But Indian poetics draws on and in turn influences, all other thought-disciplines in India so it has a trans disciplinary character (as do other disciplines in Indian education system also). In particular, it has direct relevance to the contemporary discipline of psychology since it is the theory of “emotions.” Sage Bharata’s Natya Shastra, composed approximately in the 3rd century A.D, is the basic treatise. It may be noted that Bharata assigned specific emotional or suggestive values to musical notes (svaras) and melodic patterns or (jatis or ragas), when they are used in stage presentation. A raga can become the vehicle of a mood when it is employed in an expressive context. Thus musical sounds too can be suggestive of rasa. In Indian dance, the elaborate language of hand gesture, glances, footwork, poses, and body movements is designed to enact the mood of the song. The gestures directly express feelings and other mental states. Dance and music can become vehicles of rasa. The rasas are expressed in painting and sculptures. Emotion is a criterion of painting. Poetic works treat a specific number of emotions as their subject matter. Drama is the representation of the mental states, actions and conduct of people.

Conceptualization of Rasa

Historically, Sage Bharata first conceived the rasa theory in the context of the theater and it was only later that the application of rasa was extended to all poetry. Rasa is all pervasive and cuts across generic boundaries. It is not only the most important concept in Sanskrit criticism but has influenced the theories of dance and visual arts. Rasa is multifaceted and is difficult to translate. It means aesthetic relish and comprises two key ideas: rasa is the relishable quality inherent in an artistic work, which is its emotive content. In a different sense, emotion is the relishable experience, the rasa experience, in the reader or spectator. Aesthetic experience is the act of relishing or gustation (rasana). The poem arouses certain feelings in the reader because it is the concrete objectification of those feelings. The rasa apprehended is the rasa manifested by the poem.

The concept of rasa has been interpreted in other ways. It has been spiritualized as a blissfull state of mind, comparable to the enjoyment of Brahman. Abhinavgupta’s definition of rasa as supramundane (alaukika) experience is an example. Rasa is the experience of the self as pure and unmixed bliss.

The Indian thought system has many doors and opening one forces the entrant to go through the outline architecture before assessing the contents. In the particular context of rasa, the Vedic saying raso vai sah (verily He is rasa) has been repeatedly quoted and expanded upon by the Indian thinkers on poetics. This is not a theological statement; the statement reads rasa as Brahma, the trans-epistemic that serves for God in Indian philosophy. Since emotions are experiential and in spite of the trans-epistemic character, Brahma is accessible by knowledge, action, devotion, and experience (jnana, karma, bhakti, and samadhi). The rasa experience has been called the sibling of the brahma experience (kavyanand is brahmanand sahodar). This brings us straight into discussion of what knowledge and illusion are. As a path leading to freedom (moksha), and as a target, the rasa experience is yogic in character while firmly rooted in the world–system that forms our milieu. Emotions thus become a technological device for the undoing of emotions.

Aesthetic experience is the apprehension of the created work as delight. Their objects and situational contexts define the feelings present in poem. The language of feeling is a system of symbols. It is like a language game that is understood by those who have learned its conventions and usages. Bharata deals with rasa in an objective way. Emotions in poetry come to be expressed through the conjunction of their causes and symptoms, and other ancillary feelings that accompany the emotions. Emotion becomes manifested by the object to which the emotion is directed, other exciting conditions, overt expressions, and other ancillary feelings. The rasa theory considers emotions or bhavas as acts of creation. Rasa is translated variously as emotion or mood. Essentially, the theory studies human emotions contextualizing them in the reception of creative work like poetry, drama, and other acts.

The classification explicitly listed by Sage Bharata lists eight rasas: sringar (the mood of eros), vira (knightly mood), karuna (the mood of pathos), raudra (angry mood), bhayanaka (the mood of terror), bibhatsa (the mood of revulsion), hasya (the mood of jocularity), and adbhuta (the mood of wonder). The influential commentary on Natyasastra by Abhinavagupta derived a ninth rasa, santa (the mood of total freedom) in which neither happiness nor unhappiness occur. Since then, these nine rasas have been accepted as the fundamental units. There are corresponding bhavas namely rati, hasya, soka, krodha, utsaha, bhaya, jugupsa, vismaya, and saama. Certain additions like vatsalya (love for child), bhakti (love for God) were added by later writers and these also have some acceptance. In an important Jaina work, vrida (the mood of shame) is also considered. A 17/18th century writer added maya (the mood of illusion). These later additions did not become influential.

For practical purposes then, only the nine rasas listed above need to be considered as the established consensus. It may be noted that “love for child” and “love for God” are subsumed under “erotic mood” or the “mood of love” namely sringar by those who do not accept their separate existence. Despite this nine fold division, there is an argument that fundamentally there is only one rasa. This is important for contemporary discussions since it posits that there is in fact only one emotion, which then manifests itself into many colors assuming distinct identities. This needs serious consideration.

Which one of these is the most basic rasa is a matter of dispute. Abhinavagupta takes santa (the mood of total freedom) which is implicit, as the basic one. But there have been given at least three other choices: karuna, adbhuta, and sringar. The last, sringar (the erotic mood) has been given strong theoretical support by the encyclopedic writer King Bhoj (10th century) in his Sringar Prakash. In his vision, sringar is the basic force responsible for the creation of the universe. The discourse is largely from the samkhya system of Indian philosophy but has strong inputs of advaita system.

It must be understood that as a school, the rasa domain is far from a free entry domain. While emotions like love and anger are presumably common to all human beings (at least), the theoretical investigations start not with an arbitrarily chosen person but with a sahridaya (person with a heart) who has the requisite sophistication to experience rasa. Thus we have rasabhasa (the misleading appearance of rasa), to describe the eroticity, valour and pathos etc. of animals but also of persons of low mental status (pamar). It is not the common denominator of sexuality for example, which is the take off point for sringar.

The symbolic structure of emotions involves a narrative or story of causes, consequences, and concomitants of an illusive meta-emotion — a sui generis form of consciousness —called rasa. Literally rasa means to taste, savor or to sample. The rasa theory is built around the concept of bhava. A bhava does not exist against intellection or reason. It is a stage in total intellection. Existence and mental state both are considered as bhava. Bhava is that which brings about a condition or which gets established through what happens (kaverantargatam bhavam bhavayan bhavochya). Thus existence and mental state both are bhava. Bhu means to be and bhava means that which brings about being. Thus bhava stands for Being or existence, and also the ultimate meaning (Bhavantiti bhavah; bhavayantiti bhvaah). Bhava is not against intellection but a stage in total intellection. As Bharata has stated, the dance, poetry or drama works as a catalyst and activate the bhava (emotion) that is already present.

While discussing rasas, reference is often made to performance and to the audience, which witnesses a drama. In this process, rasa becomes an autonomous meta-emotion. Rasa is translated as aesthetic pleasure/enjoyment or rapture. It is a pleasure which lasts only so long as the dramatic illusion that makes rasa a reality. The analysis of rasa has a narrative structure consisting of the causes, consequences, and concomitants. The contributions of facial expression, voice, posture, setting, character, action, and physiological response lead to the experience of rasa. It is through the samyoga (union) of bhavas that rasa becomes manifest (vibhavanubhavasancharisanyogatrasnishpattih). The bhavas emerging or emanating from an interaction of persons and events constitute the experience. The experience takes place in the case of sahridaya is an empathic viewer. The systematic analysis of bhava is done in terms of its subdivisions into vibhava, sthayibhava, (enduring, common, frequent), sancharibhava, anubhava, and sattwikbhava.

Vibhava (The determinants/eliciting conditions): This includes all the background information, settings, events, and action tendencies that might make manifest some state of the world and one’s relationship to it.

Anubhava (The consequences): It includes eight kinds of involuntary somatic responses (sweating, fainting, weeping, etc.) and various action tendencies (like abusing the body), and expressive modes (bodily movements, voice tone, facial expression, wailing and tears).

Vyabhichari/sanchari bhava (The accompanying mental states): They form a 33-item list of secondary side effects. They include emotions, feelings, and cognitive states such as weariness, reminiscences, panic, envy, dreaming, confusion, sickness, shame, and even death

Sattvic bhava (Organic manifestations of emotion): Sattva is considered as a virtue of mind that enables a person to concentrate on an object. It is spontaneously manifested in certain organic expressions. Bharata has listed eight such bhavas: stambha (inactivity), sveda (perspiration), romanca (bristling of the hairs of the body), svarabhanga (change of voice), vepathu (trembling), vaivarnyam (change of colour), asru (shedding of tears), and pralaya (insensibility). These sattvic bhavas often facilitate each other and vary in intensity.

In the course of everyday life, we experience a number of bhavas at different times. The traces of these experiences stay with us. These impressions constitute what we call samskar. The bhavas are present in us in the form of vasanas. The sthayi bhavas are dispositions or chittavrittis. When we recognize these bhavas by means of enlightened bliss in the self, the very same bhavas are designated as rasa. The experience of rasa operates as a sequence of transformations in the person. To begin with, a bhava becomes manifest due to someone or something and to some extent determined by the circumstances. Once such a condition of being appears, the person begins to overtly behave in a certain given way (anubhava). There may be a dominant bhava in the midst of a number of ancillary emotions (sancharibhavas). Each mental state is correlated with certain forms of physical demeanor and behaviour (abhinaya). The rasa experience involves the above-mentioned bhavas but is not equal to the sum of these. Instead, it has its own quality. The relationship is that of anga and angi or the various organs and the whole living organism. The various components in themselves are necessary and in totality sufficient cause ofrasa experience.

When the entire sequence of events is enacted in a text or on a stage, the reader or spectator relishes (aswad) or experiences rasa. Abhinavagupta, the chief exponent of rasa theory, locates rasa in the viewer’s or samajika’s chittavrittis. The chittavrittis or the sthayibhavas are considered as a person’s inherent predispositions. They are manifest when they come in contact with a pertinent experience. The same is generalized in a literary representation. In those moments, the viewer’s separate identity evaporates and consciousness merges in the universal experience of rasa. The rasa exists only in this apprehension, and once manifest produces alaukika anand or bliss. Though it exists only in the asvadan or relish, it may be regarded as something to be cognized.

The kind of cognition involved in rasa experience is possible because it forms the object of supra-physical (or metaphysical) consciousness assuming the witness attitude or sakshibhava. Thus it differs from other ordinary forms of cognition. This experience of bliss or ananda is an enrichment of the experiencer's sensibility. At that moment, we are endowed with the ability to have a feel of suffering etc. of another person as our own. The chitta becomes self-aware. It represents comprehension of the general nature of a bhava, such as grief, from particular instances independent of specific objects and events. It then becomes part of the self. When empathy takes place the self takes the form of ananda and the viewer is totally immersed in it. This state is rasa. It is consciousness modified by the awareness. The rasaswad or relish of an emotional state of being occurs when we are educated in our feeling (sadharanikaran). The experience requires that one should be in tune with others or sahridayata. Such a person shows communion with the aesthetic experience. A sahridaya requires a keen and intense recollection and contemplation when there is an aesthetic confrontation.

Thus we find that emotional experience involves a sequence of interrelated events that form a story. It is a unitary experience of all the components or perhaps more accurately the unitary experience of the totality. The rasa experience or rasanubhava starts at sensory level and moves to the level of imagination, level of bhava, level of sadharanikaran, to a super-conscious level that goes beyond the material world (vishwatita). We come in contact with objects of pleasure through sense organs. The objects are the medium of rasa experience. The objects lead to our imageries. We complete the experience through imagination. At this level the person changes. He or she is in a different world of his own creation. Thus the sahridaya viewer identifies with the hero who is acting in the play. He views things from the perspective of the hero and responds accordingly. This is the level of bhava. The intense bhava experience results in the loss of individuality. The experiencer of rasa generalizes it. This, however, is not the end of journey. Abhinavagupta says that the climax is the experience of bliss, pure bliss. It is the experience of self. It is in this sense that Upanishads declare raso vai sah. It's like the experience of atman.

Emotions and welbeing

In the Indian context, the main function of knowledge is to get relief from sufferings. The Indian concept of rasa draws attention to a refined subjective mental state of emotion. Emotion is also treated as a kind of spiritual cognition. Rasa involves experiencing universal self (raso vai sah). In Vedantic school of thought joy is the affective core of consciousness or existence. The idea of sat chit ananda implies that the ultimate reality is inseparable oneness of existence (sat), consciousness (chit) and joy (anand). However, at mundane level of existence pleasure and pain both are present. In fact pain and suffering often dominate our lives. But its meaning varies. Pain and pleasure both are relative. Enduring pain with a happy heart in case of athletes and mountaineers can hardly be denied. It is human smallness and egoistic feeling that leads us to dislike suffering. When our consciousness enlarges, our capacity for joy and suffering also increases. The problem of suffering is central to all thought traditions.

Life as illusion and release from birth and death cycles has been one of the key problems faced by religious and spiritual thinkers. Sri Auorobindo has proposed that the goal should not be to escape in an absolute of existence, consciousness, and bliss but to call them right down in the manifestation. He talks of a biological evolution, which will move from an embodied mind, manas, to an embodied super mind, vijnana, through transformation of our nature (see Dalal, 2001). Thus the Indian approach to affect and emotion is signally instructive from the perspective of well-being. It is emphasized that attaining wellbeing requires that we must understand our true nature or Self. It is in this sense that Chakraborty (2001) has stated that indigenous Indian psychology is anandology or science of bliss.

The true nature or Self consists of wellbeing (shiva). Wellness is the nature of being. It is held that the nature of true knowledge is not revealed to us due to ignorance. Removal of ignorance, therefore, will bring back or restore self-knowledge and therefore wellbeing. Wellbeing (shreya) is not happiness (preya). The pursuit of good life is based on dharma or virtue/righteous life (Sukhasya mulam dharmah—Kautilya). Pleasure is often defined in terms of an agreeable feeling (Sukham anukulvedaniyam) resulting from perceptible objects, which are desirable. Thus pleasure arises from the perception of desirable objects as conducive to the agent’s good. Pleasure is the cause of attraction towards its objects. It is a quality of self and characterized by self-satisfaction. While experiencing pleasure, self is agreeably affected by a desirable object (ista). The perception of desirable objects (istoplabadhi) is central to the experience of pleasure. Body is the vehicle of pleasure and pain. Pleasure is the mode of mind (antahkaran vritti) and not a quality of self. Desirelessness is supreme happiness. It is held that pleasure and pain are the modifications of intellect (budhi) and attributed to self because of nondiscrimination. There are many analyses of pleasure (see Sinha, 1961). For instance, Prasastapad refers to four types of pleasure i.e. sensuous, retrospective, prospective, and happiness. Happiness arises from wisdom, tranquility, contentment, and a peculiar merit. The worldly pleasure and pain come in cycles. Empirical life is interspersed by pleasure and pain. Udayan talks of habitual (abhyasika), self conceit (abhimanika), sentient (vaisayika) and anticipatory (manorathika) pleasures. The transcendental pleasure (niratishaya sukha or parmarthik sukha) has been talked about. Mental peace comes from sacrifice (tyaga). One needs to ponder over the fact that body is changing, but I am not body. Mine-ness leads to pain/suffering (dukha). The world is sansar, which means change. Death is inevitable. The desire of pleasure (sukh) is the cause of pain.

Here it may be noted that the utilitarian view of happiness is directly related to wealth and material security and luxury. But they do not in themselves secure happiness. The satisfaction, contentment, fulfillment, pride, serenity go beyond momentary pleasure. Hedonic (preyas) view focuses on the pleasure preferences of pleasures of the mind as well as the body. The maximization of human happiness in material terms is the goal. It has been noted that an average person is moderately happy. People in richer countries are happier than people in poor countries. Increase in national wealth in developed countries is not associated with equal increase in happiness. Within nation differences in wealth are weakly related to subjective well being. Increase in personal wealth does not lead to increase in happiness. People who strongly desire wealth and money are unhappy. Perhaps the developed countries have moved to post materialistic state (E.Diener, M.Diener & C.Diener, 1995). This is why the financial status was more positively related to life satisfaction in poor countries. Poor infrastructure constrains productivity, personal expressiveness. The eudaimonic perspective maintains that happiness is not the main criterion of well-being. Humans should not be mere slavish followers of desires. True happiness is found in the expression of virtue. True happiness can be experienced while we undertake tasks that are worth doing. It implies that not all outcomes are valuable. Thus living in accordance with true self, an authentic life where there is self-concordance

Understanding everyday emotional experience can help to address the issue of quality of life. We have made much progress on many fronts (health, food, longevity, energy, housing, transport, gadgets to offer help have made a rich life style). But we are still not happy some of the time and some people are unhappy most of the time. We can be emotionally creative by paying attention to our feelings, by cultivating certain habits of thought, and by encouraging desired emotional stances in others as well as ourselves. Let us share the eternal yearning – a quest to lead us.

I have a body, but I am not the body;
I have the senses, but I am not the sense;
I have a mind, but I am not the mind;
I have an intellect, but I am not the intellect;
I am the Eternally Blissful Pure Consciousness, which is Poorna

Shankaracharya

Endnotes

References

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