Integral phenomenology
A method for the “new psychology”, the study of mysticism and the sacred

Dennis Hargiss

There has been much talk recently concerning “the new psychology.” I feel it necessary to state from the outset that this is not the topic of my paper, for that would be rather like “putting the cart before the horse”. Instead, this paper addresses the issue of how the new psychology is to arise and presents a method or academic discipline through which such a development may come about. I say “may come about,” for that depends upon one's sadhana (spiritual discipline).

For those sadhaks among us whose calling for the present moment is to breathe, dwell in, and strengthen one's self in the subtle, thought-free atmosphere of the illimitable, what I have to say in this paper may seem secondary, perhaps elementary—even unnecessary. But for those among us who are presently called to help build the intermediate bridge between the intellectual formulations of thinking humanity and the truth vision of the gnostic seer, what follows may be of import, whether one's work arises from the illuminating insight of spiritual realisation or the ardent, burning flame of psychic aspiration.

When I initially envisioned this paper I intended to present in terms of religious psychology a model of spiritual formation for the contemporary world—a graded architectonic of the psyche, cross-cultural in scope, that would illustrate what Sri Aurobindo refers to as “the natural curve of spiritual experience”. I was then to present Sri Aurobindo and the medieval, mystic-theologian Meister Eckhart as case studies, as I have done elsewhere, for example, with the yoga sutras of Patanjali, the teaching of the Buddha as found in the Pali canon, the mystical writings of the Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria, and the haiku of the Japanese nature-mystic poet Matsuo Basho. I soon realized, however, that such a work presupposes a certain methodology and hermeneutic without which much of the assertions put forth could appear questionable or even untenable according to the rigors of academic inquiry. Consequently, I decided a short paper on methodology more appropriate for this conference, and although the following ideas were not derived from the discipline of psychology but rather through my studies in the history of religion, my hope is that they may help ensure that the house of the New Psychology will be built upon the sure foundation of sound method and process—a foundation that I term “Integral Phenomenology.”

So how does all this relate to Integral Psychology? Integral Psychology is based upon the first-hand discovery, observation and eventual mastery of the various phenomena at play within the subtle dimensions of the human psyche, as illumined by the yoga of Sri Aurobindo. According to the discipline of Integral Phenomenology, this comes about through actually “re-experiencing” through “mystical lived-experience” the fundamental realizations that form the experiential foundation of integral yoga. A corresponding spiritual state of consciousness is formed within the scholar/sadhak, and this becomes the basis for the expression of yogic insight in terms appropriate for the contemporary world.

Though this notion of the awakening or creation within oneself of the consciousness from which integral yoga derived may not have been expressed in the terms of phenomenology, it has been operative since the earliest days of the ashram. For instance, among Sri Aurobindo's earliest disciples Nolini Kanta Gupta once said: “Indeed if you want to know truly something you have to become it. Becoming gives the real knowledge. But becoming Sri Aurobindo and the Mother means what? Becoming a portion of them, a part and parcel of their consciousness...”¹ He continues:

 

“He [Sri Aurobindo] used to put me in contact with his life, ... what he was, what he represented in his consciousness. That was the central theme, because a truly great poet means a status of consciousness; in order to understand his consciousness, you must become identified with his being.”²

 

Nolini wasn't the only one with this understanding. Amrita expressed similar notions, and the Mother also stressed that to the quiet and receptive mind the sharing or identification with the being and consciousness of Sri Aurobindo may take place through the reading of his work, especially Savitri.³

Sri Aurobindo once wrote that Savitri was written “as a field of experimentation to see how far poetry could be written from one's own yogic consciousness and how that could be creative.”⁴ The power of such creative poetry lies especially in its ability to evoke, create, and foster a corresponding yogic consciousness in the contemplative mind of the reader.

In his comments on Savitri , Sri Aurobindo writes:

“The tale of Satyavan and Savitri is recited in the Mahabharata as a story of conjugal love conquering death. Satyavan is the soul carrying the divine truth of being within itself but descended into the grip of death and ignorance; Savitri is the Divine word, daughter of the sun, goddess of the supreme truth who comes down and is to save.” He continues: “Still this is not a mere allegory, the characters are not personified qualities, but incarnations or emanations of living and conscious Forces with whom we can enter into concrete touch and they take human bodies in order to help man and show him the way from his mortal state to a divine consciousness and immortal life.”²

And in all the thousands of pages in a plethora of academic tomes addressing issues of methodology and hermeneutics, there is not a clearer and more succinct description of Integral Phenomenology than that found in a couple of short lines in Sri Aurobindo's Savitri itself (p. 525):

  —

“For every symbol was a reality

And brought the presence which had given it life.”

 

The approach of integral phenomenology has arisen in response to two observations I have made in the comparative study of mysticism. First is the tendency of scholars to think in terms of dualities and to thereby create unnecessary polemics and stalemates in their work and discussions. (Such as we find in the on-going debate between constructivism and essentialism.) A second observation—stemming from such dualisms—concerns the epistemological problematic of the traditional “objective” stance required of the scholar in the study of religion. This perspective has been challenged in recent years by postmodern views questioning the very possibility of objectivity, and emphasizing the imperative of critical self-appraisal and identification of the perspectives which shape (and circumscribe) the very mental lens through which we pursue our studies. As Shelly once said in a poetic echo of Immanuel Kant, “The eye sees what it brings to the seeing.”

This problem is particularly acute in the study of mysticism due to the claim among certain mystics that the nature of mystical experience can only be understood through first-hand encounter. If, as William James once said, mystical states represent points of view superior to normal rational consciousness, and if “objectivity” is not even possible, then is the mystic or adept from within a tradition privileged, or better able to understand and explicate his area of study? Or stated differently: In the attempt to understand the different types of samadhi as mentioned in Patanjali's Yoga-Sutras (or the various rarified mind states delineated in Buddhist psychology), would one's objectives be best accomplished through a religious scholar or a realized yogi (or meditation master)?

Underneath this question lies a deeper inquiry addressing the very nature of the academic study of religion. While many religious scholars are presently involved in a debate concerning the noetic dimension of mystical experience, perhaps a more relevant inquiry for our purposes concerns the noetic dimension of religious scholarship itself. What exactly is knowledge—religious or spiritual knowledge, or knowledge of mystical matters (as distinct from mere information and theories)—and how is it related to our work as scholars of religion and psychology?

This paper relates to such questions, and consequently speaks to the larger issues concerning the future of the study of religion and the “New Psychology”. However, due to brevity it hopes at best to hint at a method of scholarship that avoids the polarities among extremists and integrates the perspectives of both scholars and mystics in a new model of “spiritual scholarship” for the coming years.

Let me first contextualize our study. Scholars in the comparative study of mysticism⁵ usually fall within one of two distinct schools.⁶ Those who maintain that all mystical phenomena are necessarily grounded within the particularities of the socio-religious frameworks within which such phenomena arose are called “constructivists” or “empirical theorists of mysticism.”⁷ They stress the irreducibility and uniqueness of a particular religious idea, experience or doctrine, and usually restrict their work to the study of a certain personage or an aspect of a single religious tradition. Those in the second school bear the appellation of “essentialist theorists of mysticism,”⁸ and accentuate the commonality—even “essential unity”—of mystical phenomena which have been observed through crosscultural study and inter-religious dialogue.

Considerable debate has taken place between these two schools, and disagreement continues concerning which of the two approaches reveals the “true” nature of mysticism.⁹ Yet from within the discipline of the phenomenology of religion may be found an alternate approach which integrates the values of both schools.

It should be noted, however, that many phenomenologists are likewise split between two similar schools: a) “concrete” or descriptive phenomenology of religion (which regards religious phenomena as unique, and consequently restricts its work to the formation of an inventory of phenomena that accentuates the historicocultural contexts of certain religious ideas and the distinct meanings that they have for believers and practitioners); and b) “essential phenomenology” (the branch that engages in crosscultural comparisons of religious phenomena in the attempt to discern shared types or common features of human religiosity). In this paper I propose an alternate approach¹⁰ that regards these schools as two complementary levels of phenomenological description. This third approach integrates the perspectives of both schools into a comprehensive view including both “surfacelevel” description of religious phenomena which believers regard as important, distinct and/or peculiar to their religion, as well as structural description of common features shared across various religious traditions.¹¹

Perhaps the most well-known and influential scholar to employ the notion of structures as an heuristic device in discovering shared features throughout the world's religions was Mircea Eliade. According to Eliade, the perceptive scholar may discern “patterns” in diverse religious phenomena, and the recognition of these patterns or “structures” facilitates our understanding of their meaning .¹² While this “search for formal structures with universal values”¹³ has recently fallen into disrepute among certain postmodern critical theorists (e.g., Foucault, Derrida), the endeavour has found support among others (such as Habermas and Halbfass) who lean away from the totalizing pretensions of deconstructionism and argue rather that deconstructionists' concerns may be integrated with meaningful dialogue and intercultural rapprochement into a pragmatic approach to communication and understanding across the traditions.¹⁴

This present study joins this on-going discussion concerning the efficacy of postulating “patterns” or “structures” as examples of the “pragmatics of communication”¹⁵ in the study of religion.

Before going further in our discussion I should clarify what is meant by the term “structure” in the discipline of integral phenomenology. Despite resonance with the term as found in structural linguistics (where the structure of language—determined by morphological, phonological, syntactic, and semantic rules—is a necessary and sufficient condition for linguistic meaning),¹⁶ our interests in hermeneutical issues draws more upon the later Husserl (e.g., Ideas [1969]) and his idea of transcendental phenomenology. (“Transcendental” here is used in a Kantian sense to refer to the view that our experience and knowledge of the world is dependent on the structure and activity of our mind.) In Husserl's attempt to establish a basis for a “critical philosophy,” he situated phenomenological method within the transcendental sphere of “pure logic,” and his notion of “structure” corresponded to this sphere in contradistinction to the empirical world available to our senses (this parallels his distinction between “formal” and “material” ontology). The task of the phenomenologist was to develop the faculty of “eidetic vision” or “intuition” ( Wesensschau /Wesensschauung ) whereby the Eidos (idea) or essence of phenomena could be apprehended. For Husserl, such “intuiting of essence” equates with the “seeing of structure,” and constitutes the necessary condition in phenomenological analysis whereby the “meaning” of phenomena becomes logically self-evident.¹⁷

Also contributing to the notions of “structure” and “meaning” in phenomenological studies were Dilthey's concepts of Erlebnis (“intentional experience”), Verstehen (“emphathetic understanding”), and Nachleben (“re-experiencing” or “reliving”). Mac Linscott Ricketts states: “For Dilthey, Erlebnis was the peculiar human faculty by which man, as distinct from animals, perceives the universe. It is the posture of the artist before the universe which enables him to feel a oneness with its essence. In order for the historian to grasp the inner meaning and purpose of history, Dilthey said that a preliminary act of sympathy or Erlebnis was necessary. The inner states of the human subject being studied by the historian must first be relived or re-experienced before history can be written” (Ricketts [1988], 105). In Dilthey's view, “we understand an expression by re-experiencing ( nach-erleben ) in our consciousness the experience from which the expression arose.”¹⁸

Eliade's teacher Nae Ionescu was also influenced by the notion of a structural level of phenomenological description. However, Ionescu went beyond the intentions of Husserl and Dilthey and developed a metaphysic that imbues the “hidden meaning” of phenomena with an unique ontological status. According to Ionescu, the “structural level” of phenomena is composed of two different types of structures. In the realm of logic and ratiocination there are various conceptual categories (st 1), and in ontological reality there exists a realm of “essences.” Such essences corresponding to the second type of “structures” (st 2), are not merely functions of our minds but rather metaphysical realities which manifest through concrete phenomena. Though these structures parallel their conceptual correspondents in the mental realm, they exist independently and are not to be confused with nor reduced to structures in the “realm of logic” (st 1). Along the vein of van der Leeuw who believed that the structural level of phenomena is to be discovered by the hermeneut through first discerning their non-linguistic meaning,¹⁹ Ionescu taught that the metaphysical reality of the ontological structure of essences (st 2) must be discovered by an intuitive insight into reality, or what he called traire , “mystical lived-experience.”²⁰

To the scholar willing to learn the discipline, this way of mystical intuition represented the hermeneutical method par excellence , for just as the recognition of patterns (st 1) helps the scholar discern the meaning of various religious phenomena, so the intuitive experience of structural essences (st 2) facilitates the understanding, expression, and explanation of metaphysical realities through conceptual formulations (i.e., in the form of “knowledge”).

Eliade combined these notions with a more Jungian understanding of structure and envisioned a discipline called “metapsychoanalysis” for the phenomenologist of religion. According to Eliade, “The symbol is not a mere reflection of objective reality. It reveals something more profound and basic. Therefore, religious symbols are capable of revealing a modality of the real or a structure of the world that is not evident on the level of immediate experience.”²¹ Here symbols are seen as the conceptual representations of essences within the organizing structure of categories (st 1), and mediate metaphysical realities to the receptive mind of the scholar—the actual realities behind the phenomena the scholar attempts to understand (st 2). Consequently, the apprehension of the symbol is not merely an academic, intellectual endeavor, but rather “the cause of the creation in [the scholar] of a spiritual state analogous with the object it represents (Ionescu).”²² Eliade states: “For this [metapsychoanalysis] would lead to an awakening, and a renewal of consciousness, of the archaic symbols and archetypes whether still living or fossilized in the religious traditions of mankind.”²³ In other words, the study and apprehension of religious symbols provide the scholar with a unique “spiritual path” and mental discipline which opens a means of cognition that includes but is not limited to theorizing and reasoning.

The study of mysticism according to integral phenomenology accentuates and further develops this notion of the intuitive apprehension of the “hidden meaning” behind religious symbols and mystical phenomena. In this sense it acquires a wealth of experience or first-hand encounter often assumed the exclusive privilege of the religious practitioner. However, it doesn't limit itself to subjective experience but draws upon the dynamics of the hermeneutical circle in the attempt to integrate such insight with the critical appraisal of the scholar. One engages the world of mystical phenomena with a more informed and open perspective (and therefore a less circumscribed capacity more able to “intuit” the meaning of such phenomena), and every time one “returns” to the rational realm of critical reflection one brings an enhanced ability to understand and describe mystical phenomena in terms of conceptual categories. It is precisely this integration and mutual reciprocity of intuitive insight and critical reflection that is the hallmark of integral phenomenology.

This approach goes beyond mere sympathy in a method akin to what Robert Neville speaks of as the “tao-daimon discipline of the academic study of religion.”²⁴ In his article entitled “The Emergence of the Historical Consciousness” Neville draws upon and develops Clifford Geertz's notion of “thick description” (i.e., a method combining “knowing about” religious phenomena with a participant-observer's understanding of how people existentially relate to such phenomena). The “tao-daimon” model acknowledges the importance of combining first-hand encounter with one's subject matter (the “Tao”) with the critical reflection of the scholar (Socrates' “Daimon”). Neville's idea that “the study of religion has indeed given rise to a dimension of spirituality that stands alongside and supplements those of the world's great religions”²⁵ resonates well with the views explicated in this paper. However, while Neville's entry into “the Tao” was through “religious participation,” the approach of integral phenomenology represents a unique path in and of itself—a path of “academic participation” or “spiritual scholarship.”

Notes and References

¹   Collected Works of Nolini Kanta Gupta (Nolini Kanta Gupta Birth Centenary, All India Press, Pondicherry, 1989), Vol.5, p. 35.

²   Ibid., p. 38.

³   These notions continue a rich discipline of scriptural exegesis ( mamamsa ) in the Indian traditions. Compare, for example, the following statement of Smirat Anirvan from an article entitled Vedic Exegesis : “Interpretation always presupposes a spiritual communion between the interpreter and the subject he seeks to interpret. This becomes imperative when one seeks to interpret a culture, a way of thought, or a thing of the Spirit. A process of saturation, resulting in a participation mystique , must set in before the eyes are ready to see and the mind to grasp.” (Italics added for emphasis. From S. Radhakrishnan et. Al., eds., The Cultural Heritage of India , Vol. 1, p. 326.) Compare also to the notions of manana and nididhyasana as described by Dr. Thomas Kochumattam in his article “Sanskrit Terminology and Christian Theology” in Unique and Universal (Bangalore: Dharmanam Pub., 1972), p. 62.

⁴   A.B. Purani, Life of Sri Aurobindo (Sri Aurobindo Ashram, Pondicherry, 1978), p. 236.

⁵   The importance of the study of mysticism was noted several decades ago in William James' landmark study The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature (New York: Modern Library, 1929). In this work, James refers to our ordinary consciousness as but one special type of consciousness among many others, and he points to the possibility of mystical states as representing “superior points of view, windows through which the mind looks out upon a more extensive and inclusive world” (296; 418-19). More recently, in Exploring Mysticism: A Methodological Essay (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), Fritz Staal states that “no theory of the mind which cannot account for mystical experiences can be adequate” (198). For a brief study summarizing the academic study of mysticism over the past two centuries see Bernard McGinn, The Foundations of Mysticism (New York: Crossroad, 1991), Appendix.

⁶    For the following observations I am indebted to the work of Denise Carmody and John T. Carmody, Mysticism: Holiness East and West (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1996), chapter 1; see also Michael Stoeber, Theo-Monistic Mysticism: A Hindu-Christian Comparison (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 7-38.

⁷   According to Stephen Katz, mystical experiences “are inescapably shaped by prior linguistic influences such that the lived experience conforms to a pre-existent pattern that has been learned, then intended, and then actualized in the experiential reality of the mystic.” From S.T. Katz, “Mystical Speech and Mystical Meaning,” in Stephen T. Katz (ed.), Mysticism and Mystical Language (New York: Oxford UP, 1992), 5. The full theoretical formulation of this contextual approach to the study of mysticism has been presented in “Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism” and “The “Conservative” Character of Mystical Experience” in Steven T. Katz (ed.), Mysticism and Religious Traditions (New York: Oxford UP, 1983), 3-60. For a recent, provocative exposition of the constructivist epistomological framework within the context of the synthesis of religions, see John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion (London: Macmillan Press, 1989).

⁸   For examples of this approach to the study of religion and religious experience see W.T. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 1961); Huston Smith, Forgotten Truth: The Primordial Tradition (New York: Harper & Row, 1976); M. Darrol Bryant (ed.), Essays on World Religions (New York: Paragon House, 1992); Alduous Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy (New York: Harper, 1945); Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism (New York: New American Library, 1974); and Caroline Franks Davis, The Evidential Force of Religious Experience (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1990). For a good secondary treatment of the primordial tradition (which is often associated with essentialist views) from the perspective of a contemporary process theologian see David Ray Griffin, Primordial Truth and Postmodern Theology (Albany, NY.: SUNY Press, 1989).

⁹   See, for example, Peter Moore, “Mystical Experience, Mystical Doctrine, and Mystical Technique,” in Steven Katz (ed.), Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis (London: Sheldon Press, 1978), and Robert Gimello, “Mysticism and Its Contexts,” in Katz (1983). For critiques of the approaches and “neo-Kantian” epistemology exemplified by the authors in the Katz volumes, see Robert K.C. Forman (ed.), The Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), and idem . Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999). See also Deirdre Green, “Unity in Diversity,” Scottish Journal of Religious Studies , vol. 3, 1 (Spring 1982), 53-60; and Donald Evans, “Can Philosophers Limit What Mystics Can Do? A Critique of Steven Katz,” in Bruce S. Alton (ed.), Religions and Languages: A Colloquim (Toronto Studies in Religion; vol 13), (New York: Peter Lang, 1991), 125-34.

¹⁰   — For related methodological studies on this matter see Eliade's article “Methodological Remarks in the Study of Religious Symbolism,” in The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology (eds.), Mircea Eliade and Joseph Kitagawa (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1959); Mircea Eliade, The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1969); and Antonio Barbosa da Silva, The Phenomenolgy of Religion as a Philosophical Problem (Sweden: CWG Gleerup, 1982).

¹¹   — For examples of this type of phenomenological work, see Mircea Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion , translated by Rosemary Sheed (London: Sheed & Ward, 1958), and idem . (Ed.), A History of Religious Ideas 3 vols. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982).

¹²   — “In the history of religions, as in other mental disciplines, it is knowledge of structure which makes it possible to understand meanings .” See Mircea Eliade, Myths, Dreams and Mysteries (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 191. See also Eliade (1969). For a study of Eliade's use of “structure” and related terms see Antonio Barbosa da Silva (1982), 210 f.

¹³   — The quote is from Michel Foucault and is taken from Thomas McCarthy, Ideas and Illusions: On Reconstruction and Deconstruction in Contemporary Critical Theorists (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1991), 6.

¹⁴   — See McCarthy, Ibid. For a related study of postmodernity and East/West dialogue see J.J. Clarke, Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter Between Asian and Western Thought (London: Routledge, 1997), 95 f., 181-225. For a study concerning Eliade and postmodernity see Bryan S. Rennie, Reconstructing Eliade: Making Sense of Religion (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), 232-41.

¹⁵   — The phrase is from Jurgen Habermas. See McCarthy, Ibid.

¹⁶   — For the application of this approach to the study of religion, see Ninian Smart, The Phenomenon of Religion (London and Oxford: Mowbrays, 1978), esp. 45 ff.

¹⁷   — Such notions greatly contributed to the philosophical background for Eliade's phenomenological method. See Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations (The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), especially 22, 62, 69-75; also idem ., Ideas (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1969), esp. 379, 395 f.

¹⁸   — The quote from Hodges is taken from the International Encyclopedia of Social Sciences (1960), Vol 4:185.

¹⁹   — “Meaning” here for van der Leeuw follows along the trajectory of Heidegger (i.e., as purpose , significance , value , importance and end ), which (for Heidegger) corresponds to the realm of transcendental-ontological “categories,” as opposed to actual ontical phenomena (a distinction that parallels that of “existential / existentiell” in Heidegger's discussions of Dasein [man], and corresponds to Kant's “transcendental / empirical” distinction.) See Gunnar Skirbekk, Truth and Preconditions (Stensilserie No 4, Universitetet I Bergen, Filosofiskt Institutt, 1970), 17-21; see also da Silva, 95, 58-60.

²⁰   — This phrase, taken from Ionescu's Metafizica , 67-69, 71-72, 77-81, is a translation of trâire (which refers to life , living , enduring , feeling , experience , etc.) and approximates the German Erlebnis . In fact, the literary critic G. Câlinescu ( Istoria literaturii române , p. 866) believed that Ionescu derived his idea of trâire from Dilthey. Though there are distinct differences between the two thinkers (especially concerning their views of metaphysics and transcendence in general), Ionescu's notion of “lived experience” has deep resonances with Dilthey's concepts of Erlebnis (“intentional experience”), Verstehen (“emphathetic understanding”), and Nachleben (“re-experiencing” or “reliving”). As mentioned before, M.L. Ricketts states: “ In order for the historian to grasp the inner meaning and purpose of history, Dilthey said that a preliminary act of sympathy or Erlebnis was necessary. The inner states of the human subject being studied by the historian must first be relived or re-experienced before history can be written” (Ricketts [1988], 105). Compare this view of Dilthey with the following by Ionescu: “My whole effort at understanding and interpreting political events is based on a precise method .... This method proceeds with the identification of structure and it appeals, therefore, primarily to intuition, to the ability to see .... This is not so easy. It demands a certain maturity in observation, a certain amount of experience .... Once you've mastered the method, however, you see all.” (From Ionescu's Roza vânturilor [April, 1932], 300-01, as quoted by Ricketts [1988], 105-06.) Also, see Ionescu's comments below concerning the apprehension of symbols.

²¹   — (Italics added for emphasis.) See M.Eliade and J. Kitagawa, The History of Religions: Essays in Methodology (Chicago: Chicago University press, 1959), 98, 101.

²²   — Ionescu, Metafizica , 134.

²³   Eliade, The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion (Chicago: Chicago U P, 1969), 35.

²⁴   — See Robert Neville's comments concerning the “secular spiritual disciplines of scholarship” in his article entitled “The Emergence of the Historical Consciousness” in Peter H. Van Ness (ed.), Spirituality and the Secular Quest (New York: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1996), 129-56; see esp. 130.

²⁵   Ibid., p. 136.